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RESOURCE DEPENDENT BRANCHING PROCESSES
AND THE ENVELOPE OF SOCIETIES
By F. Thomas Bruss and Mitia Duerinckx
Universite´ Libre de Bruxelles
Since its early beginnings, mankind has put to test many different
society forms, and this fact raises a complex of interesting questions.
The objective of this paper is to present a general population model
which takes essential features of any society into account and which
gives interesting answers on the basis of only two natural hypotheses.
One is that societies want to survive, the second, that individuals in a
society would, in general, like to increase their standard of living. We
start by presenting a mathematical model, which may be seen as a
particular type of a controlled branching process. All conditions of the
model are justified and interpreted. After several preliminary results
about societies in general we can show that two society forms should
attract particular attention, both from a qualitative and a quantita-
tive point of view. These are the so-called weakest-first society and
the strongest-first society. In particular we prove then that these two
societies stand out since they form an envelope of all possible societies
in a sense we will make precise. This result (the envelopment theo-
rem) is seen as significant because it is paralleled with precise survival
criteria for the enveloping societies. Moreover, given that one of the
“limiting” societies can be seen as an extreme form of communism,
and the other one as being close to an extreme version of capitalism,
we conclude that, remarkably, humanity is close to having already
tested the limits.
1. Introduction. What is the goal of any society? Are there natural
boundaries for societies mankind would not or cannot exceed? And if so,
can we quantify the critical parameters characterizing these boundaries?
Certain aspects of these questions are equally interesting for animal soci-
eties; in fact, throughout this paper we shall always speak of “individuals”
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to make clear that, although the motivation stems from thinking about man,
we keep general populations in mind.
The first question is partially philosophical, and we only treat it in as much
as it concerns the subsequent questions. Here we shall provide a mathemat-
ical answer obtained from a model we propose as a global mathematical
model for societies. This model is built on branching processes and submit-
ted to two natural hypotheses. Still rudimentary, the model is broad enough
to allow for essential features of life within any society: reproduction of in-
dividuals, the desire to have a future, heritage and production of resources,
consumption of resources, policies to distribute resources among individuals,
and, as a tool of interaction, the right of emigration. We look at different
sub-models of the model, characterizing different societies. These are defined
by the type of control they exercise through different policies to distribute
resources among their individuals.
1.1. Objectives of societies. Any society is likely to advertise certain key-
words in its program or mission statement, such as justice, liberty, equal
opportunity, etc. We all agree that these issues are likely to be important.
However, there may be as many different interpretations of them as there
are individuals in a population. Hence, within a whole population they can
hardly serve as real guidelines for the choice of a specific society form. We
conclude that any reasonable approach must be more focused.
The philosophy of our approach to answering questions about the choice of
a society is therefore to focus on factors which are seen as dominant, namely
those which come out of two natural and seemingly inoffensive hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1. Individuals want to survive and to see a future for their
descendants.
Hypothesis 2. Individuals prefer, in general, a higher standard of living
to a lower one.
Since these hypotheses may not be compatible with each other, we define
Hypothesis 1 to have a higher priority than Hypothesis 2.
Other hypotheses may be implicit. For instance, the desire to have security
is implicit in Hypothesis 2. If the standard of living is sufficiently high, the
society can afford a qualified police force or a strong army.
To deal with these hypotheses in an adequate way, the problem is to
find a suitable model. This requires two important conditions. First, the
model should allow for all mentioned features which are seen as essential
for the development of a human society and also for a clear interaction of
individuals within the society. Second, it should be sufficiently tractable to
allow for quantifiable conclusions.
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1.2. History of results. The first-named author has been thinking about
ways to model societies for many years. He had given a first talk on resource
dependent branching processes in 1983, a second around 1995 and a third
in 2001. Although the publications Bruss (1984) and Bruss and Robertson
(1991) were motivated by thinking about such processes, this is the very
first paper devoted to this subject.
In the beginning, only preliminary results about necessary conditions for
survival were obtained, and only for an elementary model. These results
were based on earlier work on branching processes with random absorbing
processes, on ϕ-branching processes, and on different forms of the Borel–
Cantelli lemma.
In a second step, several models were tested until the model presented here
took its approximate shape. When seeing, in a different context, the article
by Coffman, Flatto and Weber (1987), the results were sharpened to our
needs in Bruss and Robertson (1991). These opened the way to quantifiable
conclusions for the chosen model and thus to survival criteria for several
special societies.
In a third step it became visible that, in any reasonable model, two so-
cieties deserved special attention. These are what we call the strongest-first
society (s.f.-society), and the weakest-first society (w.f.-society). A survival
criterion for the w.f.-society was proved; survival criteria for the s.f.-society
were tested, and the idea of a theorem of envelopment began to emerge.
The fourth step (with the co-author) brought a broad definition of general
policies as well as a proof of a survival criterion for the s.f.-process. It also
led to the precise formulation and proof of the envelopment theorem for
societies. This theorem says (in both a conditional and an unconditional
form) that all societies are bound to live in the long run between the s.f.-
society and the w.f.-society. Combined with all earlier findings, we think this
is a fundamental result.
1.3. Related work. Our model is an asexual controlled branching process
(BP), where controlled should be understood in an interacting sense. The
general control is governed by functions of sums of dependent variables, and
self-imposed. This strong dependence property excludes the generating func-
tion machinery, of course. Moreover, although still rudimentary, the model
seems no longer to profit from martingale arguments.
Early work on controlled BPs confined interest to control through bounds
imposed on the growth of Galton–Watson-type processes. Sevast’janov and
Zubkov (1974), Schuh (1976) and others modified the number of individ-
uals which are allowed to reproduce in each generation by corresponding
deterministic functions. Bruss (1978) considered a Galton–Watson process
(GWP) with a nonspecified absorbing process for which only the expected
influence is known.
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Yanev (1976) studied so-called φ-branching processes where the growth
of the GWP reproduction is controlled by random numbers of offspring
which are allowed to reproduce. A more general model for random control
functions was studied in Bruss (1980), and again in more generality, by
Gonza´lez, Molina and Del Puerto (2002). The same authors also examined
L2-convergence for such processes; see Gonza´lez, Molina and del Puerto
(2005).
Population-size dependence is another interesting access to control in BP
models. These were studied by Klebaner (1985) and Cohn and Klebaner
(1986). Xu and Mannor (2012) proposed a special class of controlled BPs
involving a different notion of “resources.” Motivated by applications in
marketing, the objective is to control independent subpopulations (multi-
type model) in such a way that they grow as quickly as possible. Relative
frequencies of types were studied in Yakovlev and Yanev (2009).
The model presented in this paper is neither a BP with varying environ-
ment [see, e.g., Cohn (1996)] nor a BP with random environment. See Jagers
(1975) for a clear analysis of the connection between these two types, and,
for example, Haccou, Jagers and Vatutin (2007) for newer developments.
Our model is neither a multi-type BP nor a pure population size-dependent
model. It is a Markov process, as we shall see, but no phase-type Markov
model or decomposable BP [see Hautphenne (2012)] can play the control we
have in mind.
Hence, our model does not fit these or similar models studied in the lit-
erature. Nevertheless, related work is sincerely acknowledged. It has helped,
over the years, to get a feeling of what result one can, or cannot, possibly
hope for.
2. The model. We consider a population, beginning at time 0 with a
fixed number of individuals, which reproduce at distinct times n ∈N0. The
time interval [n,n + 1) is called the nth generation. Individuals consume
resources and create new resources for their descendants. Only those de-
scendants whose resource claims will be met by society will stay within the
population until the next reproduction time; the others are supposed to em-
igrate (or die) before reproduction. We first define all the components of the
model.
2.1. Reproduction. Individuals are supposed to reproduce independently
of each other. The model supposes that reproduction is asexual. The number
of descendants of each individual is modeled according to a common proba-
bility law (pj)j∈N, where pj denotes the probability that a given individual
will have exactly j offspring. To avoid trivial cases, we suppose p0 > 0 and
pj > 0 for at least some j > 1. Let D
k
n denote the number of descendants of
the kth individual in the nth generation. Hence P[Dkn = j] = pj , for all n ∈
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N, k ∈ N0 and all j ∈ N. The infinite double-array (Dkn)n∈N,k∈N0 , named re-
production matrix, thus consists of independent identically distributed (i.i.d.)
integer-valued nonnegative random variables with mean m := E(Dkn)<∞.
2.2. Resources and resource space. Human beings need food; they need
resources. They also reproduce, and thus they need resources for their de-
scendants. Hence they must save resources and create resources for future
generations.
In our model, individuals inherit resources from preceding generations,
consume resources and create new resources. The resources an individual can
use during his lifetime determines his standard of living. The society decides
in what way resources are distributed among the individuals, or expressed
differently, it is the acceptance of policies to distribute resources that defines
a society. The inherited resources, plus the newly created ones, are, after
deduction of consumption, considered to be the individual’s contribution to
the common resources of the society, called the resource space.
We do not distinguish between heritage, new production and noncon-
sumption of resources and summarize heritage plus production minus con-
sumption as creation of resources. Resource creations of individuals are mod-
eled as i.i.d. real-valued nonnegative random variables Rkn, n ∈ N, k ∈ N0,
and the infinite double array (Rkn)n∈N,k∈N0 will be called resource creation
matrix. We suppose that r := E(Rkn)<∞.
2.3. Objective of survival. The population’s desire to survive is under-
stood as the objective to have for the society as a whole a positive probability
of surviving forever. If certain rules to distribute resources allow for a posi-
tive probability of survival, and if other rules do not achieve this, then the
objective to survive takes priority, and the rules are changed accordingly. It
suffices to see changes as an omnipresent option and to think of the rules
defining the society, even if they had been changed many times before, as be-
ing fixed from today onward for the whole future. (This “fixed future-instant
control” assumption has the advantage that society need not be expected to
have long-term prophetical abilities.)
2.4. Resource claims within a society. The model interprets for each de-
scendant, the individual claim of resources as the outcome of two random
components. One is the descendant’s desire to have a certain amount of
resources, and the other is what the descendant, with its own power of con-
viction, will be able to defend among its competitors within the society.
These random claims of individuals are modeled as i.i.d. real-valued non-
negative random variables governed by a known continuous distribution
function F . If there are tn descendants in the nth generation they generate
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a string of claims (X1n,X
2
n, . . . ,X
tn
n ). The infinite double array (X
k
n)n∈N,k∈N0 ,
is called claim matrix. We have F (x) = P[Xkj ≤ x] and suppose µ :=
E(X)<∞.
2.5. Interaction of individuals and society. Each individual is supposed
to have the right to emigrate, and the control instrument is the right to
exercise the option of emigration. To fix the rules, we suppose that an indi-
vidual emigrates if and only if his individual resource claim is not completely
satisfied by the society; otherwise he remains a member of the population
until the end of the generation. Emigration is supposed to happen before
an individual produces offspring. Hence each individual resource assignment
(seen as the individual standard of living offered by the society) is felt by
an individual as being either sufficient, implying “stay,” or else insufficient,
implying “leave.”
Typically, the total resource space created by a generation is insufficient
to satisfy all the resource claims of the offspring. We define a policy as a
function which determines then a priority order among offspring, that is, a
rule to distribute the resources created by the current generation among the
next generation.
2.5.1. Examples. To keep examples simple we use here positive integers
for claims and available resources; this is not required in reality, of course.
Any random claim expresses the number of units of resources the individual
requires. Assume, for instance, that, in a given generation, the number of
individuals is 10, and that the current resource space is 100. Suppose further
that the individuals write down their claims on a list in some order, as, for
instance, in chronological order of arrival of claims, and that the string of
claims reads
11,7,15,19,11,18,10,22,17,19.
The “first-come-first-served” society would grant the first seven claims
(adding up to 91), and the last three applicants would then have to em-
igrate. The 9 remaining units may be divided among the seven or put back
into the common resources. (Details on this level will not matter for our
results.) A society that distributes resources in f.c.f.s.-order may not have
much appeal, as one may argue. However there are certainly more foolish
policies, as, for example, the “coin-flipping policy” which chooses the priority
order at random. Any procedure to select a priority of claims is considered
a policy.
In the sequel, two particular policies will attract our special interest: the
first one, called the weakest-first society, satisfies the smallest claims first and
would thus retain, in the example above, the claims 7,10,11,11,15,17,18,
while the other, called the strongest-first society, satisfies the largest claims
first and would thus retain the claims 22,19,19,18,17.
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2.6. Resource dependent branching processes. We now give a precise def-
inition of the type of population processes we consider in this paper. Two
definitions are needed. Let ((Dkn)n∈N,k∈N0 , (X
k
n)n∈N,k∈N0 , (R
k
n)n∈N,k∈N0) be a
triplet of independent double arrays of i.i.d. random variables defined on a
probability space (Ω,F ,P). As before, the variables Dkn, Xkn and Rkn (k ∈N0)
represent the number of offspring, the resource claims and the production
of resources (resp.) of each individual (labeled by k) in generation n. We
always assume that these variables satisfy the natural regularity conditions
given below; see Section 2.7. Let
Dn(k) :=
k∑
j=1
Djn and Rn(k) :=
k∑
j=1
Rjn(1)
denote the total number of offspring and the total resources created by
generation n, respectively, given that generation n counts k individuals. The
i.i.d. assumptions for random variables within the same double array allow
us to use the shorter notation D(k) = Dn(k) and R(k) = Rn(k) whenever
we limit our interest to their distributional prescriptions. Conversely, this is
understood throughout the paper whenever we use this simplified notation.
We first need a precise definition of a policy:
Definition 2.1 (Global definition of a policy). A policy is a sequence
π = (πt)t∈N, where, for all t ∈ N, πt is a function associating to any t-
uple (xk)
t
k=1 ∈ (R+)t a permutation πt((xk)tk=1) ∈ Sym(t) of the set [t] :=
{1, . . . , t}.
In this definition, t corresponds to the number of offspring, and (xk)
t
k=1 to
their respective resource claims. The permutation πt((xk)
t
k=1) ∈ Sym(t) then
gives the priority order that the society has chosen to satisfy the claims of the
offspring: the individual πt((xk)
t
k=1)(1) is the first served, etc. If s denotes
the total of resources produced by the previous generation, the number of
offspring having their claims completely satisfied thanks to the society’s
policy π is thus defined by
Qπ(t, (xk)
t
k=1, s) =

0, if t= 0 or xπt((xk)tk=1)(1)
> s,
max
{
1≤ k ≤ t :
k∑
j=1
xπt((xk)tk=1)(j)
≤ s
}
,
otherwise.
Note that this function Qπ necessarily satisfies
Qπ(0,∅, s) = 0 =Qπ(t, (xk)
t
k=1,0) and 0≤Qπ(t, (xk)tk=1, s)≤ t,
for all s ∈R+, all t ∈N and all (xk)tk=1 ∈ (R+)t. Recall that all the offsprings
that are not completely satisfied, and only these, leave the society forever.
This leads to the definition of the following stochastic process:
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Definition 2.2 (Global model). If π is a policy, the resource dependent
branching process (RDBP) on (Dkn,X
k
n,R
k
n)n,k controlled by π is defined
as the integer-valued, nonnegative stochastic process (Γn)n∈N, defined by
Γ0 = 1 and recursively
Γn+1 =Q
π(Dn(Γn), (X
k
n)
Dn(Γn)
k=1 ,Rn(Γn)),
where Dn(·) and Rn(·) are given by equation (1).
2.6.1. Remarks. (i) The notation (Γn)n is mnemonic for “general” in
the sense that the policy π in Qπ is not specified, and this is maintained
throughout this paper.
(ii) Unless specified otherwise, each process in this paper is supposed to
start at time 0 at level 1; exceptions to this will be clearly indicated.
(iii) Concerning all independence assumptions, we realize, of course, that
in a convincing model, the random variables Dkn, R
k
n and X
k
n should allow
for some interaction (dependence), and the i.i.d. assumption is primarily
made for simplicity. However, it is important to note that, in our setting,
this assumption is less restrictive than it may seem. Indeed, recall that Hy-
pothesis 1 is given priority to Hypothesis 2. If a population wants to know
whether survival is possible, it must look at the current situation, because
we do not assume in the model that the population knows more about the
long-term future. Therefore the question is what would happen if the current
situation were maintained for the future. Each time a change is warranted,
for instance, an encouragement to have more descendants, or to increase
resource creation, the matrices can be exchanged. It is this instant control
mentioned earlier which gives considerable support to all independence as-
sumptions.
2.7. Regularity assumptions. We suppose that the following assumptions
are always satisfied:
(i) 1<m<∞, r <∞ and 0< µ<∞;
(ii) p0 > 0 and there exists some k ≥ 2 with pk > 0;
(iii) the trio of laws of reproduction, creation of resources and claims is
compatible with a positive probability, however small it might be, that the
process can reach any finite state;
(iv) the variables (Dkn)n,k, (R
k
n)n,k and (X
k
n)n,k all have finite variance;
(v) (the random variables Dkn, R
k
n and X
k
n are all bounded).
2.7.1. Justification of assumptions. In assumption (i), the conditions
m > 1 and µ > 0 do not restrict generality: the case m ≤ 1 is trivial be-
cause then any RDBP is stochastically smaller than a subcritical GWP.
With the natural condition p0 > 0 of (ii) it is bound to die out. The case
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µ = 0 implies that (Xkn)n,k consists only of 0’s, so that the process coin-
cides with the standard GWP. Survival is thus possible if and only if m> 1,
implying pk > 0 for some k ≥ 2, hence (ii).
Assumption (iii) ensures that the process can grow. It is, for instance,
satisfied if we assume that F (r/k)> 0 for some k ≥ 2 with pk > 0. Note that
this assumption becomes superfluous if we replace the initial setting Γ0 = 1
by Γ0 =L for some L sufficiently large.
The assumption of finite variances of all random variables is needed for
our results and is also completely realistic.
Finally, assumption (v) of boundedness is, apart for two results (i.e., The-
orems 4.7 and 4.13), not needed and therefore put in brackets. Note that
even this stronger assumption is well defendable in our model, at least for
human societies.
2.8. Multi-parameter policies. According to our definition, a policy can
only depend on the available resources and on the claims of the offspring.
However, in more realistic models, the offspring could be characterized by
many other different parameters, and it would be natural to allow a policy
to depend on all these additional parameters. This is why, although we do
not pursue such general models in this paper, we will indicate shortly how
to adapt our definitions accordingly.
We consider a new double array (Ykn)n,k of i.i.d. random p-vectors defined
on a corresponding probability space (Ω,F , P ). Here, the components of the
random vectors Ykn (k ∈ N0) correspond to the different characteristic pa-
rameters of each individual (labeled by k) in generation n. For some fixed
p≥ 0, a p-parameter policy is any sequence π = (πt)t∈N, where, for all t ∈N,
πt is a function associating to any t-uple (xk,yk)
t
k=1 ∈ (R+ × B)t a per-
mutation πt((xk,yk)
t
k=1) ∈ Sym(t) of the set [t] := {1, . . . , t}, where B ⊂ Rp
denotes the set of possible parameter values. The associated counting func-
tion and the associated RDBP are defined as before. For instance, the coin-
flipping policy could be seen as a trivial example of a multi-parameter policy,
where the coin-flipping parameter actually determines the whole policy.
Note that the situation is trivial when the additional parameters of an
individual are assumed to be independent of its number of offspring, its
resource claim and its resource production, and when we consider some
multi-parameter policy that only depends on these additional parameters
(but not on the resource claims): in this case, the associated RDBP has ex-
actly the same behavior as the f.c.f.s.-process (as defined below). In general,
the dependence may of course lead to highly complex situations.
3. Particular policies. In the following, we define policies of particular
interest. The first will be a neutral policy, which we call the first-come-first-
served policy. It will serve as a point of comparison with the weakest-first
policy and the strongest-first policy defined later.
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3.1. First-come-first-served policy. The f.c.f.s.-policy is a neutral policy
in the sense that it serves the claims according to their respective arrival
times. To exclude ambiguities in the definition, these arrivals of claims are
supposed to happen at the beginning of each generation, being almost surely
different, and all preceding the times of producing offspring.
Definition 3.1. The first-come-first-served policy (f.c.f.s.-policy) is the
policy πU defined by πUt ((xk)
t
k=1) = id[t].
1
The associated function C :=Qπ
U
counting the individuals staying in the
process is
C(t, (xk)
t
k=1, s) =

0, if t= 0 or x1 > s;
sup
{
1≤ k ≤ t :
k∑
j=1
xj ≤ s
}
, otherwise.
Definition 3.2. The first-come-first-served process (f.c.f.s.-process) on
(Xkn ,D
k
n,R
k
n)n,k is the RDBP controlled by π
U , that is, the stochastic process
(Un)n∈N defined by U0 = 1, and recursively by
Un+1 =C(Dn(Un), (X
k
n)
Dn(Un)
k=1 ,Rn(Un)).
Note that C(t, (Xkn)
t
k=1, s)+ 1 is a stopping time with respect to the nat-
ural filtration (Fℓ)ℓ, where Fℓ denotes the σ-field generated by the Xkn ’s
for 1 ≤ k ≤ ℓ. It is useful to refer to stopping-time properties because fre-
quently we use results which become intuitive if we think of a version of
“Wald’s lemma” for curtailed random variables; see Section 4 of Bruss and
Robertson (1991).
Interpretation and properties. The f.c.f.s.-society may be seen as a model
of a laissez-faire society. When individuals are born, they are assumed to
arrive at different times within their generation at maturity and then submit
their random resource claims. This continues as long as resources are avail-
able. Since the claims are i.i.d. random variables, it is not the society but the
scarcity of resources that imposes constraints. This process has some sim-
ilarity with the GWP because, for given distributions of resource creation
and claims, the claims curtail the effective mean m of the offspring distribu-
tion (pk)k. However, given that the process depends in each generation on
common resources, the similarity with a GWP is still rather limited.
1The notation piU should remind of the unordered x1t , . . . , x
t
t used in the definition.
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3.2. Weakest-first policy. The weakest-first policy (w.f.-policy) is an ex-
treme policy, giving priority successively to the least demanding currently
remaining offspring.
Definition 3.3. The weakest-first policy (w.f.-policy) is the policy πW
defined by πWt ((xk)
t
k=1) = σ, where σ is the permutation of [t] such that
xσ(1) ≤ · · · ≤ xσ(t) .
Throughout this paper, for i.i.d. realizations (xk)
t
k=1 of the random vari-
able X , the increasing order statistics will be denoted by x1,t ≤ x2,t ≤ · · · ≤
xt,t. The associated counting function N :=Q
πW is now
N(t, (xk)
t
k=1, s) =

0, if t= 0 or x1,t > s,
sup
{
1≤ k ≤ t :
k∑
j=1
xj,t ≤ s
}
, otherwise.(2)
Definition 3.4. The weakest-first process (w.f.-process) on (Dkn,X
k
n,
Rkn)n,k is the RDBP controlled by π
W , that is, the stochastic process (Wn)n∈N
defined by W0 = 1, and recursively by
Wn+1 =N(Dn(Wn), (X
k
n)
Dn(Wn)
k=1 ,Rn(Wn)).(3)
Note that N(·, ·, ·) counts the maximal number of increasing order statis-
tics of the random sample (xk)
t
k=1 which, starting with the smallest, can be
summed up without exceeding s. Further, N(t, (Xkn)
t
k=1, s)+ 1 is a stopping
time on the filtration (FIℓ )ℓ say, generated by the ℓ first increasing order
statistics from all order statistics, beginning with the smallest one, but it is
not a stopping time with respect to the natural filtration (Fℓ)ℓ.
Interpretation and properties. The policy of the w.f.-society is to support
always the weakest. In that respect it comes close to the ideas of socialism
and communism. In each generation, individuals are ordered according to
their resource claims, and these order statistics are highly dependent of each
other.
The following lemma will be needed throughout.
Lemma 3.5. N(t, (xk)
t
k=1, s) is increasing in both t and s.
Proof. This follows immediately from Definition 3.3. 
12 F. T. BRUSS AND M. DUERINCKX
3.3. Strongest-first policy. The strongest-first policy (s.f.-policy) gives
successively priority to the most demanding currently remaining offspring,
that is to the largest random claims.
Definition 3.6. The strongest-first policy (s.f.-policy) is the policy πS
defined by πSt ((xk)
t
k=1) = σ, where σ is the permutation of [t] such that
xσ(1) ≥ · · · ≥ xσ(t) .
The associated counting function M :=Qπ
S
becomes
M(t, (xk)
t
k=1, s) =

0, if t= 0 or xt,t > s,
sup
{
1≤ k ≤ t :
t∑
j=t−k+1
xj,t ≤ s
}
,
otherwise.
(4)
It counts the maximal number of decreasing order statistics which can be
summed up, starting with the biggest, without exceeding s.
Definition 3.7. The strongest-first process (s.f.-process) on (Xkn ,D
k
n,
Rkn)n,k is the RDBP controlled by π
S , that is, the stochastic process (Sn)n∈N
defined by S0 = 1, and recursively by
Sn+1 =M(Dn(Sn), (X
k
n)
Dn(Sn)
k=1 ,Rn(Sn)).(5)
We note that M(t, (Xkn)
t
k=1, s) + 1 is a stopping time on the filtration
(FDℓ )ℓ generated by the first ℓ decreasing order statistics of all currently
presented claims, beginning with the largest one. It is again no stopping
time on the natural filtration (Fℓ)ℓ.
Interpretation and properties. The s.f.-society is the model which serves
the strongest individuals first. Since we identified the values of resource
claims with the power to defend these claims, this society shares important
features with free-market policies and an uncontrolled capitalistic society.
Since claims are again highly dependent, the technical difficulty in this model
is comparable with the one evoked for the w.f.-society.
For a closer study of the s.f.-process, we will need later the following
definition:
Definition 3.8. We say that a function h : [t1, t2]→ R defined on an
interval [t1, t2]⊂R is cap-unimodal if it is either monotone, or else unimodal
and cap-shaped, on [t1, t2].
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Note that a cap-unimodal function h on [t1, t2] satisfies
min
t∈[t1,t2]
h(t) = min{h(t1), h(t2)},(6)
provided that h is defined in both t1 an t2. The following lemma then con-
trasts Lemma 3.5:
Lemma 3.9. M(t, (xk)
t
k=1, s) is increasing in s for fixed t, and, for fixed
s, cap-unimodal in t on any interval [t1, t2]. Further, maxt∈[t1,t2]M(t, (xk)
t
k=1,
s)≤ t2 − t1 +M(t1, (xk)t1k=1, s).
Proof. See Section 6.1. 
Remark 3.10. If resources are plenty and suffice to accommodate all
claims, then all policies have the same effect; that is, they allow all individu-
als to stay and reproduce. However, if not, the w.f.-society is the one which
allows the maximum number of individuals to stay and to reproduce. The
s.f.-society is then opposite in the sense that the resource space is used up
by the corresponding minimum number of applicants.
4. Main results. Throughout this section, all RDBPs are supposed to be
controlled by some policy π on (Dkn,X
k
n,R
k
n)n,k, where all random variables
satisfy the assumptions of Section 2.7.
4.1. Preliminaries. It is important to first point out that any RDBP
shares the following property, which is typical for many branching processes.
Namely, either it explodes, or it becomes extinct.
Proposition 4.1 (Markov property). Any RDBP (Γn)n is a Markov
process with a unique absorbing state, which is 0. Moreover, it tends a.s.
either to 0 or to ∞.
Proof. See Section 6.1. (The same result remains true in the multi-
parameter case.) 
In accordance with Hypothesis 1, we must first answer the question un-
der which conditions a given RDBP (Γn)n can survive, that is, we must
determine when the extinction probability
qΓ =P
[
lim
n→∞
Γn = 0|Γ0 = 1
]
is equal to 1. Note that, in the case qΓ < 1, the probability of extinction
could intuitively be made arbitrarily small if we replace the initial setting
Γ0 = 1 by Γ0 =M for M sufficiently large. We will in fact prove this for
several processes, and for the w.f.-process this holds even in a stronger form:
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Proposition 4.2 (“Safe-haven” property of the w.f.-process). For all
L ∈N0,
P
[
lim
n→∞
Wn = 0|W0 = L
]
≤ qLW .
Proof. See Section 6.1. 
Hence, if a society fears extinction it may change to become a w.f.-society
and likely survive unless qW = 1, or L is small. Also, as we shall see later
on, qW = 1 implies qΓ = 1 for any RDBP (Γn)n, so that in that case no
change in policy could avoid extinction. The w.f.-society may be seen as the
“safe-haven” society form with respect to Hypothesis 1.
4.2. Uniform upper-bound process. It turns out that the w.f.-process is
always an upper bound for any other RDBP, and this in the strongest sense:
Proposition 4.3 (Uniform upper bound). Let (Γn)n be any RDBP,
and let (Wn)n be the w.f.-process defined on the same double arrays. Then,
for all n, we have Γn ≤Wn a.s. In particular, qW ≤ qΓ.
Proof. See Section 6.2. (The same result remains true in the multi-
parameter case.) 
4.2.1. Nonexistence of a uniform lower-bound process. We now turn to
a comparison between (Γn)n and the corresponding s.f.-process (Sn)n. This
is a more subtle problem. Indeed, it is in general not true that Sn ≤ Γn a.s.
for all n.
This may come somewhat as a surprise. Indeed, since the s.f.-society
is clearly the most restrictive one for the number of offspring which can
stay, one feels that (Γn)n should always do at least as well as the process
(Sn)n governed by the s.f.-policy. An explicit counterexample is given in
Section 6.2: it is based on the fact that M(t, (xk)
t
k=1, s) is, for fixed s, in-
creasing in t up to some threshold ts but decreasing for t≥ ts. However we
can explain here already what is behind it.
Suppose (Sn)n and (Γn)n have the same number k of individuals at time
n. Then it follows from the counting function comparison that Γn+1 is at
least as large as Sn+1. Hence we expect on average more offspring from Γn+1
than from Sn+1. But then the extreme claims of the offspring of Γn+1 must
be expected to be larger than those from the offspring of Sn+1. If the policy
of (Γn)n serves just one of the larger claims, the inequality established in
generation n+1 may point to the opposite direction in generation n+2.
Therefore, we see that no nontrivial uniform lower bound can exist for
general RDBPs, and thus all attempts to compare general trajectories would
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be fruitless. We found it highly interesting that, nevertheless, we can prove
the Envelopment theorem presented in Section 4.6 (see Theorem 4.13). This
will justify the fact that we can essentially restrict our attention to the
w.f.-policy and the s.f.-policy, which we will study in the next sections.
The f.c.f.s.-policy will be considered as a point of comparison later on (see
Section 4.5).
4.3. Extinction criterion for the w.f.-process.
Theorem 4.4. Let (Wn)n be the w.f.-process on (D
k
n,X
k
n,R
k
n)n,k.
(a) If r≤mµ and if τ is the solution of∫ τ
0
xdF (x) =
r
m
,(7)
then:
(i) if mF (τ)< 1, then qW = 1;
(ii) if mF (τ)> 1, then qW < 1.
(b) If r >mµ, then qW < 1.
Moreover, in cases (a)(ii) and (b), we even have
P
[
lim
n→∞
Wn = 0|W0 =L
] L→∞−−−→ 0.(8)
Further, if there is no extinction, the process explodes a.s. and behaves more
and more like a supercritical GWP with a new reproduction mean m˜(> 1),
say, defined by
m˜=
{
m, if r ≥mµ,
mF (τ), if r <mµ and mF (τ)> 1.
Proof. See Section 6.3. Equation (8) follows from Proposition 4.2. 
The following remarks will provide a better understanding of these results.
Remarks 4.5. (i) The case (b) is the most intuitive one. Indeed, the
condition r >mµ means that a typical ancestor creates in expectation more
resources than his offspring will claim together. Consequently, when the
population grows the law of large numbers ensures that the process will
behave more and more like a supercritical GWP, the asymptotic properties
of which are well understood [see, e.g., Bingham and Doney (1974)]. For this
argument to hold, the regularity assumption (iii) (see Section 2.7) is needed
to ensure that the process can reach any finite size with positive probability;
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this condition becomes redundant if we replace the initial setting W0 = 1 by
W0 =w for w sufficiently large.
(ii) Theorem 4.4 is sharp in the sense that mF (τ) = 1 is the exact separa-
tion point between a.s. extinction and positive survival probability. However,
unlike what occurs with GWPs, it is here not immediate to see under which
conditions on the law (pk)k and on F the critical case implies a.s. extinction.
Note that, for fixed m and F , the parameter τ = τ(r/m) is increasing in r,
so that the equation mF (τ) = 1 defines a critical mean resource production
rW,c below which qW = 1 and above which qW < 1.
Note that the survival conditions depend deeply on the distribution F of
the claims. The following special cases give criteria in terms of the first two
moments only. From the point of view of applications, this is more attractive
since F may not be known precisely.
Corollary 4.6. Let (Wn)n be the w.f.-process on (D
k
n,X
k
n,R
k
n)n,k.
(i) If µ < r, we have qW < 1.
(ii) Assume r ≤mµ(1 −
√
1− 1/m). If VarX < (mµ−r)2m(m−1) − µ2(> 0), we
have qW = 1.
Proof. See Section 6.5. 
4.4. Extinction criterion for the s.f.-process. We now present the extinc-
tion criterion for the s.f.-process. Since we deal here again with a process
depending on the partial sum behavior of order statistics—now on the sum
of the largest ones—we expect analogies. To facilitate a comparison between
the s.f.-process and the w.f.-process we had made the assumption [recall (v)
in Section 2.7] that resource claims are bounded above.
However, many important difficulties will arise, and the comparison with
the w.f.-process will only be possible for a very small part of the proof. In
particular, we will need here the boundedness of all the random variables
Dkn, X
k
n and R
k
n [see (v) in Section 2.7].
Theorem 4.7. Let (Sn)n be the s.f.-process on (D
k
n,X
k
n,R
k
n)n,k.
(a) If r≤mµ and if θ is the solution of∫ b
θ
xdF (x) =
r
m
,(9)
then:
(i) if m(1− F (θ))< 1, then qS = 1;
(ii) if m(1− F (θ))> 1, then qS < 1.
(b) If r >mµ, then qS < 1.
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Moreover, in cases (a)(ii) and (b), we even have
P
[
lim
n→∞
Sn = 0|S0 = L
] L→∞−−−→ 0.(10)
Further, if there is no extinction, the process explodes a.s. and behaves more
and more like a supercritical GWP with a new reproduction mean m˜(> 1),
say, defined by
m˜=
{
m, if r ≥mµ,
m(1−F (θ)), if r <mµ and m(1− F (θ))> 1.
Proof. See Sections 6.4 and 6.8. 
Remark 4.8. Equation (10) rejoins Proposition 4.2 in a weaker sense.
The critical case is now determined by the equation m(1− F (θ)) = 1. Note
that, for fixed m, the parameter θ = θ(r/m) is decreasing in r, in the same
way that, in Theorem (4.4), τ(r/m) was increasing in r. The equation m(1−
F (θ)) = 1 thus defines the critical mean resource production rS,c.
Note that the survival conditions depend deeply on the distribution of
the claims and are thus quite difficult to interpret in practice. The following
special cases, expressed in terms of the two first moments of the claims only,
are more easy to interpret:
Corollary 4.9. Let (Sn)n be the s.f.-process on (D
k
n,X
k
n,R
k
n)n,k.
(i) If r < µ, we have qS = 1.
(ii) Assume r≥ µ√m. If VarX < r2/m− µ2(> 0), then we have qS < 1.
Proof. See Section 6.5. 
4.5. Extinction criterion for the f.c.f.s.-process. As a term of compari-
son, it is interesting to observe what happens in the case of a f.c.f.s.-process.
Proposition 4.10. Let (Un)n be the f.c.f.s.-process on (D
k
n,X
k
n,R
k
n)n,k.
(a) If r < µ, then qU = 1.
(b) If r > µ, then qU < 1.
Moreover, in case (b), we even have
P
[
lim
n→∞
Un = 0|U0 =L
] L→∞−−−→ 0.(11)
Further, if there is no extinction, the process explodes a.s. and behaves more
and more like a supercritical GWP with reproduction mean m.
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Remark 4.11. As in the case of the w.f.-process, the regularity assump-
tion (v) (see Section 2.7) is not needed in the proof of the above result. The
critical mean resource production is now simply defined by rU,c = µ.
4.6. Envelopment theorems. As explained in Section 4.2, although the
w.f.-process constitutes a uniform upper bound process, no nontrivial uni-
form lower bound process can possibly exist for general RDBPs. In this
section we shall see that, however, the s.f.-process constitutes a lower bound
process in a sense that is strong enough to call it an envelopment from be-
low. Firstly, conditioned on survival, (Sn)n has the lowest limiting growth
rate of all RDBPs. Secondly, if an arbitrary RDBP (Γn)n cannot survive,
the s.f.-process (Sn)n cannot survive either.
4.6.1. Conditional envelopment theorem. Let us first consider a general
RDBP (Γn)n. Since 0 is an absorbing state, we define Γn+1/Γn = 0 if Γn = 0.
If Γn+1 > 0 we may see Γn+1/Γn as the empirical growth rate in period n.
We know that for some societies the empirical growth rates will converge
a.s. to a limit in time, as, for instance, for the w.f.-process, the s.f.-process,
the f.c.f.s.-process, and others. But then, given our very general definition
of a policy π, it is also clear that there are many processes for which the
empirical growth rates do not converge; it suffices to think, for example, of
societies which apply very different rules according to the number of claims
being even or odd.
The following result shows that, conditioned on survival, the growth rates
of any RDBP will finally be between the growth rates of the w.f.-process and
the s.f.-process.
Proposition 4.12. Let (Γn)n be any RDBP on (D
k
n,X
k
n,R
k
n)n,k. Let
γ = lim inf
n→∞
Γn+1
Γn
, γ¯ = limsup
n→∞
Γn+1
Γn
.
Given that Γn→∞ (i.e., γ > 0), we have
m(1−F (θ))≤ γ ≤ γ¯ ≤mF (τ),
where τ and θ are defined as in Theorems 4.4 and 4.7.
Proof. See Section 6.6. 
Hence, there may be no limiting growth rate of a RDBP, but the lim inf
and the limsup of empirical growth rates are, conditioned on survival, bound-
ed by the limit growths rates of the w.f.-process and the s.f.-process. This
can be seen as a conditional envelopment result with the w.f.- and the s.f.-
policies as extreme policies. If the lim inf and limsup coincide, we can call
the limit γ (without much abuse of terminology) the “Malthusian” growth
rate.
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4.6.2. Unconditional envelopment theorem. We shall prove a stronger
unconditional result: if there is a positive survival probability for the process
(Γn)n, then, given that the size of the process (Γn)n is sufficiently large, the
growth rate of that process dominates, with overwhelming probability, that
of the corresponding s.f.-society at all times n≥ n0. This is essentially the
statement of Proposition 6.8 in Section 6.7, and this allows us to deduce the
following envelopment theorem.
A few definitions are needed: for any L ∈N0, let (Sn(L))n, (Γn(L))n and
(Wn(L))n denote, respectively, the s.f.-process, an arbitrary RDBP, and the
w.f.-process, each starting with initial size L. Hence, Sn = Sn(1), Γn =Γn(1)
and Wn =Wn(1). Also let θ be defined as in Theorem 4.7.
Theorem 4.13 (Envelopment theorem). Assume that m(1− F (θ)) 6= 1
if r ≤mµ. Then,
P
[
lim
n→∞
Sn(L)≤ lim
n→∞
Γn(L)≤ lim
n→∞
Wn(L)
] L→∞−−−→ 1.
Moreover, qW = 1⇒ qΓ = 1⇒ qS = 1.
Proof. See Section 6.7. (The same result holds in the multiparameter
case.) 
Proposition 6.8 in Section 6.7 will give more precise information about the
lower bound. Such bounds are of considerable theoretical interest, and, as we
shall now see, they are also serving as useful directives for individuals who
have decided to adapt a specific type of society. Indeed, if the probability
laws of the random variables (Dkn)n,k, (X
k
n)n,k and (R
k
n)n,k are fixed up to
their mean m, µ and r, respectively, then it is in practice interesting to
determine the critical mean resource production rΓ,c(m,µ), say, relative to
the RDBP (Γn)n, that is, the value such that
qΓ = 1 if r < rΓ,c(m,µ) and qΓ < 1 if r > rΓ,c(m,µ).
By Theorem 4.13, the following can be deduced:
Corollary 4.14 (Critical curves for survival). For all m,µ, we have
rW,c(m,µ)≤ rΓ,c(m,µ)≤ rS,c(m,µ).
Therefore, the study of the two extreme RDBPs gives highly relevant in-
formation about general RDBPs, without having to understand every single
possible policy (see examples in Section 5). As we have seen, the computa-
tion of the critical mean resource production even shows more. The point is
that the mean claim value plays only one part but that the resource claim
distribution function F (which determines the mean, of course) plays itself
an important part. Hence society may try to take influence on individuals to
settle, under a fixed mean claim µ, for a distribution F which favors survival.
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Remark 4.15. If D, X and R were not assumed to be independent,
Theorem 4.13 would in general not remain true: the w.f.-policy and the s.f.-
policy would a priori not remain extreme policies. We could then naturally
wonder how different dependence patterns yield different extreme policies.
Such questions may attract interest for further studies.
5. Examples. We now give examples. It will be interesting to notice that
the critical mean resource production for a w.f.-process turns out to be lower
than one would intuitively expect.
(i) Let F be the uniform distribution function on (0, d), say. Then µ =
d/2. As in Theorems 4.4(a) and 4.7(a), let r <mµ=md/2 and suppose that
F (r/k)> 0 for some k ≥ 2 with pk > 0.
First, focus on the corresponding w.f.-process. The value of τ [see equa-
tion (7)] is thus determined by:
r
m
=
∫ τ
0
xdF (x) =
∫ τ
0
1
d
xdx=
τ2
2d
,
which yields τ =
√
2dr/m. Therefore, F (τ) =
√
2r/(md). The critical mean
resource production rw,c is thus determined by
mF (τ) = 1 ⇐⇒
√
2rw,cm/d= 1
which implies rw,c = d/2m = µ/m. Note that, rw,c = d/2m, which is for
larger m not far from the expected value of the smallest order statistic of
claims of 2m descendants. With such a low creation of resources, the f.c.f.s.-
process or s.f.-process would die out very quickly, as we shall see now.
For the s.f.-process we need θ defined by [see equation (9)]:
r
m
=
∫ d
θ
1
d
xdx=
d2 − θ2
2d
,
and straightforward calculations yield rs,c = d(1− 1/2m) = µ(2− 1/m).
We note that the critical mean resource production is now 2m− 1 times
higher than for the corresponding w.f.-process. Hence, if individuals living
in the w.f.-society on the critical value of creation and want to change to
the s.f.-society, then they must increase their average resource creation by
a factor 2m− 1 to be able to survive in the long run, that is, an enormous
difference. For instance, if m= 3, the critical resource creation mean must
increase by factor five to maintain a chance of survival! Comparing with
the corresponding critical mean resource production for a f.c.f.s.-process,
ru,c = µ, gives
ru,c− rw,c = µ(1− 1/m) = rs,c − ru,c.
THE ENVELOPE OF SOCIETIES 21
Fig. 1. For d= 2 (µ= 1), the critical mean resource productions rw,c and rs,c are plotted
(in blue and in red, resp.), as functions of m.
Figure 1 compares the behavior of rw,c and rs,c as functions of m. The area
between the two curves corresponds to a control area, where the population
can survive or get extinct depending on the policy.
(ii) Of course, we realize that the uniform distribution pushes the largest
and the smallest order statistics far apart. Therefore, it is informative to
look also at a case when the resource claim distribution is more concentrated
around its mean, as, for instance, in the case of a beta distribution on (0,1),
with parameters a and b, say. The distribution function is then defined on
(0,1) by the regularized incomplete beta function: F (x) = Ia,b(x). The mean
resource claim is given by µ = aa+b . As in Theorems 4.4(a) and 4.7(a), let
r <mµ= ama+b and suppose that F (r/k)> 0 for some k ≥ 2 with pk > 0.
First, focus on the corresponding w.f.-process. The value of τ [see equa-
tion (7)] is determined by
r
m
=
∫ τ
0
xdF (x) =
∫ τ
0
xa(1− x)b−1
B(a, b)
=
B(a+1, b)
B(a, b)
Ia+1,b(τ)
=
a
a+ b
Ia+1,b(τ),
which yields τ = I−1a+1,b(
r
m
a+b
a ). The critical mean resource production rw,c
is thus defined by
mF (τ) = 1 ⇐⇒ mIa,b
(
I−1a+1,b
(
rw,c
a+ b
am
))
= 1,
which implies
rw,c =
am
a+ b
Ia+1,b(I
−1
a,b (1/m)).
Now look at the corresponding s.f.-process. The value of θ [see equa-
tion (9)] is determined by
r
m
=
∫ 1
θ
xdF (x) =
a
a+ b
(1− Ia+1,b(θ)),
22 F. T. BRUSS AND M. DUERINCKX
which yields θ = I−1a+1,b(1 − rm a+ba ). Straightforward calculations then give
the critical mean resource production rs,c =
am
a+b(1− Ia+1,b(I−1a,b (1− 1/m))).
Observing that Iα,β(1 − x) = 1 − Iβ,α(x), we deduce that I−1α,β(1 − x) =
1− I−1β,α(x). The formula for rs,c can thus be rewritten as
rs,c =
am
a+ b
Ib,a+1(I
−1
b,a (1/m)).
For a f.c.f.s.-process, the corresponding critical mean resource production
simply reads ru,c = µ. Further, for large m, we can use the approximation
Iα,β(z) =
zα
B(α,β)
(
1
α
+
1− β
α+ 1
z +O(z2)
)
;
see, for example, Pearson (1968). Straightforward calculations then give, at
leading order,
rw,c =
a
a+1
(
a
m
B(a, b)
)1/a
+O(m−2/a),
and
rs,c = 1+
b
b+1
(b− a(b+ 1))
(
b
m
B(b, a)
)1/b
+O(m−2/b).
Figure 2 shows the critical areas in some typical cases, as the peak is cen-
tered, moved to the left or to the right. Figure 3 shows, in the centered case,
how the critical area narrows as the dispersion around the peak diminishes.
Fig. 2. The critical mean resource productions rw,c and rs,c are plotted as functions of
m, in the case of a B(a, b) resource claim distribution, for typical values of (a, b): (2,10)
in blue, (14,14) in yellow and (10,2) in red.
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Fig. 3. The critical mean resource productions rw,c and rs,c are plotted as functions of
m, in the case of a B(a, b) resource claim distribution, for different symmetric values of
(a, b): (1,1) in blue, (2,2) in pink, (3,3) in red, (4,4) in orange and (10,10) in red.
(iii) In the third example we choose a case where resource claims are
not bounded. Our results in the s.f.-case can therefore not be used directly
but it is interesting to see what happens to the corresponding w.f.-process.
Let F be the distribution function of an exponential random variable with
parameter λ. The mean resource claim is given by µ= 1/λ. As in Theorem
4.4(a), let r <mµ=m/λ and suppose that F (r/k)> 0 for some k ≥ 2 with
pk > 0. The value of τ is determined by [see equation (7)]
r
m
=
∫ τ
0
xdF (x) =
∫ τ
0
λxe−λx dx=
1
λ
− e
(
τ +
1
λ
)
e−λ(τ+1/λ)
which yields τ =− 1λ(1+W[−λe ( 1λ− rm )]), where W[·] denotes the Lambert W
function; see, for example, Corless et al. (1996). The critical mean resource
production rw,c is thus determined by
mF (τ) = 1 ⇐⇒ m
(
1− exp
(
W
[
−λ
e
(
1
λ
− rw,c
m
)]
+1
))
= 1.
After simplifications, we get rw,c =
1
λ(1− (m−1) log ( mm−1 )), where we recall
that 1λ = µ. For larger m, this becomes rw,c ≈ 1/(2λm) = µ/(2m), that is,
about one half of what is required for U [0,1]-claims.
6. Proofs.
6.1. Preliminary results. We first prove Lemma 3.9.
Proof of Lemma 3.9. The property of M(t, (xk)
t
k=1, s) being increas-
ing in s is evident from the definition. To see unimodality in t, let I(t, s) =
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1{∑tj=1 xj,t ≤ s}. Then (4) can be written as
M(t, (xk)
t
k=1, s) = I(t, s)t+ (1− I(t, s)) sup
{
1≤ k ≤ t :
t∑
j=t−k+1
xj,t ≤ s
}
,
where sup∅ := 0. This sum is clearly linearly increasing in t as long as
I(t, s) = 1; it is decreasing in t as soon as I(t, s) = 0, since the k largest
order statistics are increasing with the sample size t. Hence, if t1, t2 ∈ N0,
then, for fixed s,M(t, (xk)
t
k=1, s) is either monotone increasing or monotone
decreasing on [t1, t2], or else takes its maximum somewhere in (t1, t2). This
means that M is cap-unimodal in t, and hence the minimum
min
t∈[t1,t2]
M(t, (xk)
t
k=1, s)
is assumed in either t1 or t2. Finally, the estimate for the corresponding
maximum on [t1, t2] is evident from the definition of M(t, (xk)
t
k=1, s). 
We now prove Proposition 4.1.
Proof of Proposition 4.1. Let π be some policy (in the sense of
Definition 2.1). Given Γn, the distributions of Dn(Γn) and Rn(Γn) are inde-
pendent from Γ1, . . . ,Γn−1, so that
Γn+1 =Q
π(Dn(Γn), (X
k
n)
Dn(Γn)
k=1 ,Rn(Γn))
is independent of Γ1, . . . ,Γn−1, given Γn. Thus, (Γn)n is a Markov process.
Now note that, since Qπ(0,∅, s) = 0 and Dn(0) = 0 for all n ∈ N, we have
{Γn = 0} ⊂ {Γn+1 = 0} so that 0 is an absorbing state for the process (Γn)n.
Moreover, since
Γn+1 =Q
π(Dn(Γn), (X
k
n)
Dn(Γ)
k=1 ,Rn(Γn))≤Dn(Γn),(12)
it follows that
P[Γn+1 = 0|Γn]≥ P [Dn(Γn) = 0|Γn] = pΓn0 ,(13)
where the last equality holds because of the assumption of independent
reproduction. Therefore, the absorbing state 0 is accessible from any state
s ∈N, with at least probability ps0 > 0. The state 0 is thus the only absorbing
state, and, as (Γn)n is a Markov process, we conclude
P[0< Γn ≤ s i.o.] = 0 ∀s ∈N0.(14)
The same arguments immediately adapt to multiparameter policies. 
We now turn to the proof of Proposition 4.2. The idea is that we compare
the behavior of (Wn)n in each step n with a process consisting of Wn i.i.d.
versions of a weakest-first process starting with one individual.
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Proof of Proposition 4.2. Let L ∈N0 and let W (1)n , . . . ,W (L)n be L
i.i.d. copies of a weakest-first process. We then have the following (super-
additivity-type) inequality, namely, for all n,k ∈N0,
P[Wn ≤ k|W0 = L]
(15)
≤ P[W (1)n + · · ·+W (L)n ≤ k|W (1)0 = · · ·=W (L)0 = 1],
which we shall prove first.
To see this, we begin with the case n= 1.
The case L= 1 is trivial; hence suppose L> 1. The LHS of (15) becomes,
by an additional conditioning on D1(L)∼D(L),
P [W1 ≤ k|W0 = L]
= P [D(L)≤ k] + P [W1 ≤ k|D1(L)> k,W0 = L]P [D(L)> k],
where we have used the facts that the distribution of D(L) depends only on
L (and not on the generation number), and also that W1 cannot possibly
exceed D1(W0) =D1(L).
Now suppose we do the same conditioning on the RHS of (15), that is, for
the offspring of the L partitioned processes. The first term P [D(L)≤ k] is
then the same on both sides, since, as before, reproduction of individuals is
independent. Hence, subtracting equal terms on both sides we can now limit
our interest to the corresponding second term with more than k offspring.
The distributions of the total created resource space and of the claims
are by definition the same on both sides; therefore it suffices to look for the
moment at the influence of the order statistics of claims in a fixed sequence
of claims on a fixed resource space R, say.
In the LHS model of (15), the resource space R is global (i.e., united)
because all descendants from the different families contribute to a common
resource space. In the RHS model of (15), this resource space is, however,
local (i.e., compartmented). On the LHS the count of individuals to stay is
therefore the count of the globally smallest order statistics of claims which
can be successively accommodated by R whereas on the RHS the count is on
the locally smallest order statistics of claims. The latter, put in increasing
order, are a subsequence of the sequence of claims in increasing order. Hence
the RHS count cannot exceed the lhs count.
Passing from the counting argument to the corresponding probability
measures on both sides proves (15) for n = 1, that is, under the condition
W0 =L the number of descendants staying in the population is stochastically
larger than W
(1)
1 + · · ·+W (L)1 , that is, for all j ∈N0,
P[W1 ≥ j|W0 =L]≥ P[W (1)1 + · · ·+W (L)1 ≥ j|W (1)0 = · · ·=W (L)0 = 1].
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But now, we can iterate this argument. Clearly inequality (15) must hold
in particular if we replace, on the RHS only, the number L by some L′
with L′ ≤ L. Hence the stochastic order is maintained through the next
generation, and thus, by recurrence, through all generations. This implies
that (15) is true for all n ∈N0.
Finally, choosing k = 0 in (15) and taking the limit for n→∞, we obtain
by independence of the processes (W
(j)
n )n that
P[Wn→ 0|W0 = L]
(16)
≤ P[W (1)n → 0, . . . ,W (L)n → 0|W (1)0 = · · ·=W (L)0 = 1] = qLW ,
which completes the proof. 
Remark 6.1. The superadditivity-type inequality (15) is in general no
longer correct if the w.f.-process is replaced by other RDBPs. Indeed, a very
large claim may force on the RHS all the offspring of one subpopulation to
leave, but this effect stays still local whereas it may be large on the global
LHS. This exemplifies at the same time the adherent difficulty in estimating
extinction probabilities for arbitrary policies.
6.2. Uniform bounds. We first prove Proposition 4.3.
Proof of Proposition 4.3. Let π be any policy (the same arguments
immediately adapt to multiparameter policies). First note that, by definition
of N and M ,
M(t, (xk)
t
k=1, s)≤Qπ(t, (xk)tk=1, s)≤N(t, (xk)tk=1, s)
(17)
∀t, ∀(xk)tk=1, ∀s.
We shall now show by induction that if (Γn)n is the RDBP controlled by π,
it follows that Γn ≤Wn a.s. for all n, given W0 = Γ0 = 1. Indeed, it is true at
any time at which the two processes have the same number of individuals,
and hence for n= 0.
Now, if it is true for some n, we deduce that, a.s.,
Γn+1 =Q
π(Dn(Γn), (X
k
n)
Dn(Γn)
k=1 ,Rn(Γn))(18)
≤N(Dn(Γn), (Xkn)Dn(Γn)k=1 ,Rn(Γn))(19)
≤N(Dn(Wn), (Xkn)Dn(Wn)k=1 ,Rn(Wn)) =Wn+1,(20)
as the mapping (t, s) 7→ N(t, (xk)tk=1, s) is increasing in both arguments.
Hence the inequality is also true for n+1.
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It follows that P[Γn ≤Wn] = 1 for all n. Since the limiting extinction
probabilities of (Γn)n and (Wn)n must exist, we must also have qW ≤ qΓ.

We now give an explicit counterexample showing that it is in general not
true that Sn ≤ Γn a.s. for all n, given S0 = Γ0 = 1. The underlying idea was
already explained in Section 4.2.1.
Counterexample. We have assumed pk > 0 for some k ≥ 2 [see regularity
assumption (ii) in Section 2.7]; to fix ideas, assume that p3 > 0 (the argument
can be adapted in any case). Then consider the deterministic policy π given
by
πt((xk)
t
k=1)(j) =

σ(3), if j = 1 and t≥ 3,
σ(1), if j = 2 and t≥ 3,
σ(2), if j = 3 and t≥ 3,
σ(j), otherwise,
(21)
where σ is the permutation such that xσ(1) ≥ · · · ≥ xσ(t) [i.e., by definition,
σ = πSt ((xk)
t
k=1)]. Let, for example,
D10 = 3, X
1
0 >X
2
0 >X
3
0 , X
1
0 +X
3
0 <R
1
0 <X
1
0 +X
2
0 ,
D11 =D
2
1 = 3, X
1
1 +X
2
1 +X
3
1 ≤R11
and then
X41 ,X
5
1 ,X
6
1 >R
1
1 +R
2
1.
These events will occur simultaneously with positive probability, as p3 > 0.
But then we immediately see that Γ2 = 0< 3 = S2 in this case.
6.3. Extinction criterion for the w.f.-society. In this section, we will
prove Theorem 4.4. In these proofs, we will repeatedly make use of the
following lemma, which we shall prove first.
Lemma 6.2. Let X1,X2, . . . be i.i.d. real-valued nonnegative random
variables with mean µ <∞ and continuous distribution function F . Further,
let (Φn)n be a sequence of integer-valued random variables with Φn →∞
a.s. as n→∞, and let (Ψn)n be a sequence of real random variables with
Ψn→∞ a.s. as n→∞. Suppose that Ψn/Φn→ ρ a.s. with 0< ρ≤ µ, and
that τ is the solution of ∫ τ
0
xdF (x) = ρ.
Let N be defined by (2). Then N(Φn, (Xk)
Φn
k=1,Ψn)/Φn→ F (τ) a.s.
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Moreover, if the random variables X1,X2, . . . are bounded, then we have
an analogous result for M defined in (4): defining θ as the solution of∫ b
θ
xdF (x) = ρ,
then M(Φn, (Xk)
Φn
k=1,Ψn)/Φn→ 1−F (θ) a.s.
Proof. Since Ψn/Φn→ ρ > 0 a.s. as n→∞, we have
∀ε > 0 P
[
sup
n≥b
∣∣∣∣ΨnΦn − ρ
∣∣∣∣< ε]→ 1 a.s. as b→∞.(22)
To simplify notation, we write N(t, s) :=N(t, (Xk)
t
k=1, s). (Note that this
simplification is here admissible since the distribution of the string of claims
depends only on t.)
As the function N(t, s) is stochastically increasing in s, we deduce from
almost-sure convergence of Φn/Ψn to ρ that, for all 0≤ ε < ρ and all δ > 0,
the inequalities
N(Φn, (ρ− ε)Φn)
Φn
≤ N(Φn,Ψn)
Φn
≤ N(Φn, (ρ+ ε)Φn)
Φn
(23)
must hold (simultaneously), for all n sufficiently large, with probability at
least 1− δ.
We now use Theorem 2.2 (on page 615) of Bruss and Robertson (1991).
This theorem [refining a result of Coffman, Flatto and Weber (1987)] implies
that
N(n, sn)
n
→ F (τ(s)) a.s. as n→∞,(24)
where τ(s) is the solution of∫ τ(s)
0
xdF (x) = lim
n→∞
sn
n
=: s,(25)
provided that the latter limit exists and satisfies 0< s≤ µ=E[X].
Now note that τ(·) is continuous on (0, µ) because F is assumed to be
continuous on its support.
As Φn →∞ a.s., the left-hand side variable of (23) must converge a.s.
to F (τ(ρ− ε)) and the right-hand side variable of (23) a.s. to F (τ(ρ+ ε)).
Since ε > 0 is arbitrary and
lim
ε→0+
F (τ(ρ± ε)) = F (τ(ρ))
by continuity of F (·) and τ(·), the first part of the lemma is proved.
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The second part of the lemma, that is, the statement that
M(Φn, (Xk)
Φn
k=1,Ψn)/Φn→ 1−F (θ) a.s.,
can now be proved similarly, using Theorem 2.3 of Bruss and Robertson
(1991). Note that we need here, as stated, the assumption that the resource
claims are bounded, since the cited Theorem 2.3 may not hold otherwise.

We can now prove Theorem 4.4.
Proof of Theorem 4.4. We first prove statement (a). Suppose r ≤mµ
and mF (τ)< 1, and let
W∞(Ω) = {ω ∈Ω:Wn(ω)→∞ as n→∞}.(26)
In the following, we can use the shorthand notation Nn(t, s) :=N(t, (X
k
n)
t
k=1,
s), where again the index n will be dropped only if the distribution is used.
Now look at
E[Wn+1|Wn =w] = E[Nn(Dn(w),Rn(w))|Wn =w].(27)
Since Rn(w)/w→ r a.s. as w→∞ and Dn(w)/w→m a.s. as w→∞ and
m> 0, we have Rn(w)/Dn(w)→ ρ := r/m a.s. According to Lemma 4.1 (on
page 622) of Bruss and Robertson (1991), there exists a sequence Tw → τ
a.s. as w→∞ with
E[Nn(Dn(w),Rn(w))|Wn =w]≤ E[Dn(w)]F (Tw),(28)
where τ is the solution of ∫ τ
0
xdF (x) = ρ=
r
m
.
Since F is continuous we can find, for each ε > 0, a value w =w(ε) such that
F (Tv)≤ F (τ + ε) for all v ≥w. Thus, from equations (27) and (28),
E[Wn+1|Wn = v]≤mvF (τ + ε), v ≥w.(29)
Hence we get
E[Wn+1|Wn ≥w] =
∞∑
v=w
P[Wn = v|Wn ≥w]E[Wn+1|Wn = v](30)
≤mF (τ + ε)
∞∑
v=w
vP[Wn = v|Wn ≥w](31)
=mF (τ + ε)E[Wn|Wn ≥w].(32)
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Since mF (τ)< 1, we can choose, again by continuity of F , a positive value
ε sufficiently small such that mF (τ + ε) < 1. The latter implies then that
(E[Wn])n must be bounded. Consequently, Proposition 4.1 implies that
P[W∞(Ω)] = 0, or equivalently, since (Wn)n is Markovian, qW = 1.
This proves the first part of Theorem 4.4(a).
To see the second part of Theorem 4.4(a), we now suppose that r ≤mµ
and mF (τ) > 1. Recall that we had supposed that any finite level can be
reached with a strictly positive probability [see regularity assumption (iii)
in Section 2.7]. Therefore it suffices to show that, for w sufficiently large,
∃α≥ 1 liminf
k→∞
P[Wn+k ≥ αkw|Wn ≥w]> 0.(33)
Let now
h(j,α,w) := P[Wn+j < α
jw|Wn+j−1 ≥ αj−1w].(34)
It follows that
P[Wn+k ≥ αkw|Wn ≥w]
(35)
≥ (1− h(k,α,w))P[Wn+k−1 ≥ αk−1w|Wn ≥w]
and thus by recurrence on k that
P[Wn+k ≥ αkw|Wn ≥w]≥
k∏
j=1
(1− h(j,α,w)).(36)
Therefore a sufficient condition for (33) to hold is
∞∑
j=1
h(j,α,w) <∞.(37)
Since Nn(·, ·), Dn+j(·) and Rn+j(·) are all stochastically increasing in their
arguments, we have
h(j,α,w) = P[Wn+j < α
jw|Wn+j−1 ≥ αj−1w](38)
= P[Nn+j(Dn+j(Wn+j−1),
(39)
Rn+j(Wn+j−1))<α
jw|Wn+j−1 ≥ αj−1w]
≤ P[Nn+j(Dn+j(⌊αj−1w⌋),Rn+j(⌊αj−1w⌋))< αjw].(40)
Choose ε > 0 such that (m− ε)F (τ) > 1, and put α = (m− ε)F (τ). Then
we have pα0 < 1 so that
∞∑
j=1
p
⌊αj−1w⌋
0 =
∞∑
j=1
P[Dn+j(⌊αj−1w⌋) = 0]<∞.(41)
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Since the Dn+j are independent random variables, it follows from the Borel–
Cantelli lemma that P[Dn+j(⌊αj−1w⌋) = 0 j-i.o.] = 0. Therefore, for j suffi-
ciently large, inequality (40) is equivalent to
h(j,α,w)≤ P[L∗j <R∗j ],(42)
where the LHS variable is defined by
L∗j =
Nn+j(Dn+j(⌊αj−1w⌋),Rn+j(⌊αj−1w⌋))
Dn+j(⌊αj−1w⌋)(43)
and the corresponding RHS variable by
R∗j =
αjw
Dn+j(⌊αj−1w⌋) .(44)
Now let βj = ⌊αj−1w⌋.
First look at the random variables Dn+j(βj)/βj ∼D(βj)/βj (and recall
that, whenever we drop indices of variables in our notation, then this means
that we use information on their distributional prescription only). D(k) is
hence distributed like a sum of k i.i.d. random variables with finite mean m
and finite variance σ2D, say.
Recall that α > 1, and that βj/j→∞ as j→∞. Therefore, it follows from
the Hsu–Robbins theorem of complete convergence [see Theorem 1 of Hsu
and Robbins (1947), or Asmussen and Kurtz (1980)] that D(βj)/βj →m
completely as j→∞. Note that complete convergence holds row-wise in the
reproduction matrix since all Djk are i.i.d. and have finite variance. This
implies
∀δ > 0
∞∑
j=1
P
[∣∣∣∣D(βj)βj −m
∣∣∣∣> δ]<∞.(45)
Further, since αjw/βj → α as j→∞ and Dn+j(·) ∼D(·), we obtain from
(44) and (45)
∀δ > 0
∞∑
j=1
P
[∣∣∣∣R∗j − αm
∣∣∣∣> δ]<∞.(46)
Second, to study the convergence of L∗j defined in (43) we turn to Lemma 6.2
with Φj =D(βj) and Ψj =R(βj). Since Φj/βj →m completely and Ψj/βj →
r completely (again by the Hsu–Robbins theorem), we have
Ψj
Φj
→ ρ= r
m
completely, as j→∞.(47)
Therefore, in particular, Ψj/Φj → ρ a.s., so that the conditions of Lemma 6.2
are satisfied. It follows that if L∗j in (43) allows for a limit (in some sense)
l, say, then we must have l= F (τ), where τ is defined as in Lemma 6.2.
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Using this and the Chernov-type estimates obtained by Coffman, Flatto
and Weber (1987) (see Theorems 2 and 3) with a= jδ, we obtain after some
straightforward simplifications,
P
[∣∣∣∣N(·, ·)j − F (τ)
∣∣∣∣> δ]≤ 2e−(jδ2)/(4F (τ)).(48)
Again Nn+j(·, ·)∼N(·, ·) and βj/j→∞, and thus L∗j → F (τ) completely as
j→∞. This implies the convergence
∀δ > 0
∞∑
j=1
P[|L∗j −F (τ)|> δ]<∞.(49)
Now choose δ = 12 |F (τ)−α/m| > 0. Note that the event {L∗j <R∗j} can only
occur if |L∗j −F (τ)|> δ or |Rj −α/m|> δ. Therefore, from (42),
h(j,α,w) ≤ P[L∗j <R∗j ](50)
≤ P[|L∗j − F (τ)|> δ] + P
[∣∣∣∣R∗j − αm
∣∣∣∣> δ](51)
so that, according to (46) and (49),
∞∑
j=1
h(j,α,w) <∞.(52)
This completes the proof of statement (a).
Statement (b) is obtained similarly (and more easily) using Theorem 2.1
of Bruss and Robertson (1991).
Finally, using Lemma 6.2, it is clear that, if r ≤ mµ and mF (τ) > 1,
conditioning on survival, we have Wn+1/Wn→mF (τ) a.s. as n→∞, and
thus, for any ε, δ > 0, there exists some large Lε,δ > 0 such that
P
[
sup
n≥Lε,δ
∣∣∣∣Wn+1Wn −mF (τ)
∣∣∣∣< δ∣∣∣ limn→∞Wn =∞
]
≥ 1− ε.(53)
This precisely means that, conditioning on survival, the w.f.-process behaves
more and more like a GWP with the modified reproduction mean m˜ =
mF (τ). 
6.4. Extinction criterion for the s.f.-society (first part). In this section,
we are concerned with the proof of Theorem 4.7. The first part of Theo-
rem 4.7(a) can be obtained by similar considerations as for Theorem 4.4
(the extinction criterion for the w.f.-society), the role of τ being now played
by θ, defined by ∫ b
θ
xdF (x) =
r
m
,
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as in Theorem 2.3 of Bruss and Robertson (1991). However, here we need the
assumption that the resource claims are bounded as assumed in the model,
simply because the cited Theorem 2.3 may not hold otherwise. (This was
not needed in the case of the w.f.-society where we only used that the claims
have a finite variance.)
Proof of Theorem 4.7(a)(i). The proof of the first part of Theo-
rem 4.7(a) follows the same reasoning as for Theorem 4.4 [see equations (26)–
(32)] and yields correspondingly that, for all ε > 0, there exists a sufficiently
large s such that
E[Sn+1|Sn ≥ s]≤m(1−F (θ − ε))E[Sn|Sn ≥ s].(54)
Choosing ε sufficiently small such that m(1 − F (θ − ε)) < 1 shows that
(E[Sn+1|Sn ≥ s])n is bounded, so that (E[Sn])n is bounded too. Hence, sim-
ilarly as before, qS = 1. 
For the other parts of Theorem 4.7, adapting the proof of Theorem 4.4
seems difficult. The major technical difficulty is that we have to deal with the
cap-unimodality of M(·, ·) in its first argument [while N(·, ·) was increasing
in both arguments].
Cap-unimodality implies that the minimum of M(D(t),R(t)) for given
D(t) and R(t) over an interval [t1, t2] must be taken on the border, but gives
less information about the corresponding maximum. The estimate t2 − t1
for the difference between the maximum and the minimum over [t1, t2] (see
Lemma 3.9) is here too crude. We therefore have to proceed differently, and,
in order to use arguments developed later, the rest of this proof is postponed
to Section 6.8.
6.5. Corollaries 4.6 and 4.9. We shall need the following two lemmas,
which we prove first:
Lemma 6.3. Assume r > µ, and let τ be defined by∫ τ
0
xdF (x) =
r
m
.
Then mF (τ)> 1.
Proof. Let a ≥ 0 be the infimum of the support of F . As F (x) > 0
for all x > a and as τ > a [because
∫ τ
0 xdF (x) =
r
m >
µ
m ≥ 0], we deduce
F (τ)> 0, and we can write
mF (τ)
∫ τ
0
x
dF (x)
F (τ)
= r > µ,
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or equivalently,
mF (τ)E[X|X ≤ τ ]>µ.
However, E[X|X ≤ τ ]≤E[X] = µ, so that the above inequality cannot hold
unless mF (τ)> 1. 
Lemma 6.4. Assume r < µ, and let θ be defined by∫ ∞
θ
xdF (x) =
r
m
.
Then m(1− F (θ))< 1.
Proof. Let b≥ 0 be the least upper bound of claims. As 1−F (x)> 0 for
all x < b and as θ < b [because
∫∞
θ xdF (x) =
r
m > 0], we deduce 1−F (θ)> 0,
and we can write
m(1− F (θ))
∫ ∞
θ
x
dF (x)
1− F (θ) = r < µ,
or equivalently
m(1−F (θ))E[X|X > θ]< µ.
However, E[X|X > θ]≥E[X] = µ, so that the above inequality impliesm(1−
F (θ))< 1. 
We can now prove Corollary 4.6.
Proof of Corollary 4.6. Using Lemma 6.3 and Theorem 4.4(a)(ii),
part (a) is immediate. It remains to prove part (b). Using the Cauchy–
Schwarz inequality, we deduce directly from the definition of τ ,
r
m
=
∫ τ
0
xdF (x) = µ−
∫ b
τ
xdF (x)(55)
≥ µ−
√
1−F (τ)
√∫ b
τ
x2 dF (x)≥ µ−
√
1− F (τ)
√
E[X2],(56)
so that, after straightforward simplifications, mF (τ) ≤ m − (mµ − r)2/
(mE[X2]). Hence, if
E[X2]< (mµ− r)2/(m(m− 1)),
we deducemF (τ)< 1 and thus, by Theorem 4.4(a)(i), we must have qW = 1.

We now turn to the proof of Corollary 4.9.
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Proof of Corollary 4.9. Using Lemma 6.4 and Theorem 4.7(a)(i),
part (a) is immediate.
It remains to prove part (b).
Using the Cauchy–Schwarz inequality, we deduce directly from the defi-
nition of θ
r
m
=
∫ b
θ
xdF (x)≤
√
1−F (θ)
√∫ b
θ
x2 dF (x)≤
√
1−F (θ)
√
E[X2].(57)
Hence, if E[X2]< r2/m, we deduce
m(1−F (θ))≥ r2/(mE[X2])> 1
and thus, by Theorem 4.7(a)(ii), we must have qS < 1. 
6.6. Conditional envelopment theorem. We prove here Proposition 4.12.
Proof of Proposition 4.12. Assume that Γn→∞ is given, that is,
that γ > 0 is given. First compare the process (Γn)n with (Sn)n. We see from
the corresponding counting functions Qπ and M that
γ = lim inf
n→∞
Γn+1
Γn
= lim inf
n→∞
Qπn(Dn(Γn),Rn(Γn))
Γn
(58)
≥ lim inf
n→∞
Mn(Dn(Γn),Rn(Γn))
Γn
,(59)
where the last inequality follows from the definition of the functionM . Since
the latter is increasing in the second argument and cap-unimodal in the first
argument, we define (neglecting the floor–roof symbols which are here of no
importance)
M˜ εn(Γn) = min{Mn((m−ε)Γn, (r−ε)Γn),Mn((m+ε)Γn, (r−ε)Γn)},(60)
so that, for all 0< ε <min(r,m),
γ ≥ lim inf
n→∞
1
Γn
M˜ εn(Γn) = lim infn→∞
m
Dn(Γn)
M˜ εn(Γn).(61)
Now, let θ−ε and θ
+
ε be defined, respectively, by∫ ∞
θ−ε
xdF (x) =
r− ε
m− ε and
∫ ∞
θ+ε
xdF (x) =
r− ε
m+ ε
.(62)
Then, from Lemma 6.2, we get
M˜ εn(Γn)
Dn(Γn)
≥min{1− F (θ−ε ),1−F (θ+ε )},(63)
36 F. T. BRUSS AND M. DUERINCKX
for all sufficiently large n. Hence, using equations (61) and (63), as well as
the continuity of θ−ε and θ
+
ε as functions of ε, we deduce
γ ≥m(1− F (θ)).(64)
Second, we must compare (Γn)n with (Wn)n. This is done similarly and
more easily because N(·, ·) is monotone increasing in both arguments. This
yields then directly the other stated inequality γ¯ ≤mF (τ) and the proof is
complete. 
6.7. Unconditional envelopment theorem. In this section, we are con-
cerned with the proof of Theorem 4.13. In the case when r ≤mµ, we define
τ and θ as in the statement of Theorems 4.4 and 4.7. When r > mµ, these
are not defined, but, to simplify notations, we then define F (τ) := 1 and
1− F (θ) := 1.
First of all, we shall need the following interesting result, which is a far-
reaching strengthening of equation (53):
Theorem 6.5. For any ε > 0 and any δ > 0, there exists some suffi-
ciently large Lε,δ > 0 such that, if mF (τ)> 1,
P
[
sup
l≥0
∣∣∣∣Wn+l+1Wn+l −mF (τ)
∣∣∣∣< δ∣∣∣Wn ≥Lε,δ]≥ 1− ε,
and similarly, if m(1− F (θ))> 1,
P
[
sup
l≥0
∣∣∣∣Sn+l+1Sn+l −m(1−F (θ))
∣∣∣∣< δ∣∣∣Sn ≥ Lε,δ]≥ 1− ε.
It should be noted that this result constitutes a new proof of part (a)(ii)
of Theorem 4.4, and it will be used to deduce part (a)(ii) of Theorem 4.7
in the next section. In order to prove this result, we shall crucially make
use of the following Chernov-type estimates, which we prove first, based on
Theorems 2 and 3 of Coffman, Flatto and Weber (1987):
Lemma 6.6. For any δ > 0, there exists constants C, c > 0 such that, for
all n, j ≥ 0,
P
[∣∣∣∣Wn+1Wn −mF (τ)
∣∣∣∣> δ∣∣∣Wn = j]≤Ce−cj,(65)
and similarly,
P
[∣∣∣∣Sn+1Sn −m(1−F (θ))
∣∣∣∣> δ∣∣∣Sn = j]≤Ce−cj.(66)
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Proof. By definition,
P
[∣∣∣∣Wn+1Wn −mF (τ)
∣∣∣∣> δ∣∣∣Wn = j]
(67)
= P
[∣∣∣∣Nn(Dn(j),Rn(j))j −mF (τ)
∣∣∣∣> δ].
Let η > 0. As Nn :=Nn(·, ·) is increasing in both arguments, conditioning on
|Rn(j)/j − r| ≤ η (resp., > η) and on |Dn(j)/j −m| ≤ η (resp., > η) in the
RHS, we obtain, after several elementary transformations, that the latter
rhs is bounded above by
P
[∣∣∣∣Nn(j(m+ η), j(r + η))j −mF (τ)
∣∣∣∣> δ]
+P
[∣∣∣∣Nn(j(m− η), j(r − η))j −mF (τ)
∣∣∣∣> δ](68)
+P
[∣∣∣∣Dn(j)j −m
∣∣∣∣> η]+P[∣∣∣∣Rn(j)j − r
∣∣∣∣> η].
Choosing η small enough such that |(m+η)F (τ((r+η)/(m+η)))−mF (τ)|<
δ/2, the first term of (68) becomes smaller than
P
[∣∣∣∣Nn(j(m+ η), j(r + η))j − (m+ η)F
(
τ
(
r+ η
m+ η
))∣∣∣∣> δ2
]
(69)
≤ 2exp
(
− δ
2j
16mF (τ) + 8δ
)
,
where the last inequality follows from Theorems 2 and 3 of Coffman, Flatto
and Weber (1987). The second term of (68) can be bounded similarly.
The two last terms also satisfy an exponential bound by Hoeffding’s in-
equality [see Theorem 2 of Hoeffding (1963)], since the random variables Dkn
and Rkn are assumed to be bounded. This proves the result in the weakest-
first case.
As far as the strongest-first case is concerned, now using the cap-unimodality
as well as a simple bound for the minimum and the maximum ofMn over the
respective intervals (see Lemma 3.9), we can deduce a bound similar to (68)
(with some additional terms), and the result will follow in an analogous way.

The following result constitutes a first step in the proof of Theorem 6.5:
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Proposition 6.7. For any ε > 0 and any δ > 0, there exists some suf-
ficiently large Lε,δ > 0 such that, if mF (τ)> 1,
P
[⋂
l≥0
{
Wn+l+1
Wn+l
>mF (τ)− δ
}∣∣∣Wn ≥ Lε,δ]≥ 1− ε,
and similarly, if m(1− F (θ))> 1,
P
[⋂
l≥0
{
Sn+l+1
Sn+l
>m(1−F (θ))− δ
}∣∣∣Sn ≥Lε,δ]≥ 1− ε.
Proof. Choose 1< m˜<mF (τ), and take δ =mF (τ)− m˜ > 0. Then we
can write the following inequalities, for any L> 0 and any n≥ 0:
P
[
Wn+l+1
Wn+l
> m˜, ∀l≥ 0
∣∣∣Wn ≥L](70)
= 1−
∞∑
l=0
P[Wn+j+1 > m˜Wn+j
(71)
for all 0≤ j < l, and Wn+l+1 ≤ m˜Wn+l|Wn ≥L]
≥ 1−
∞∑
l=0
P
[
Wn+j+1 > m˜Wn+j
(72)
for all 0≤ j < l, and
∣∣∣∣Wn+l+1Wn+l −mF (τ)
∣∣∣∣≥ δ∣∣∣Wn ≥ L],
since m˜=mF (τ)−δ. Now, givenWn ≥L, the inequalitiesWn+j+1 > m˜Wn+j
for all 0≤ j < l imply that Wn+l ≥ m˜lL. Using this and dropping the inter-
section yields
P
[
Wn+l+1
Wn+l
> m˜, ∀l≥ 0
∣∣∣Wn ≥ L](73)
≥ 1−
∞∑
l=0
P
[∣∣∣∣Wn+l+1Wn+l −mF (τ)
∣∣∣∣≥ δ∣∣∣Wn+l ≥ m˜lL](74)
≥ 1−
∞∑
l=0
∞∑
j=m˜lL
P
[∣∣∣∣Wn+l+1Wn+l −mF (τ)
∣∣∣∣≥ δ∣∣∣Wn+l = j]
(75)
≥ 1−C
∞∑
l=0
∞∑
j=m˜lL
e−cj,
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where the last inequality follows from the Chernov-type estimates given in
Lemma 6.6. Now, since m˜ > 1, a straightforward calculation yields
∞∑
l=0
∞∑
j=m˜lL
e−cj =
∞∑
l=0
e−cm˜
lL
∞∑
j=0
e−cj =
1
1− e−c
∞∑
l=0
e−cm˜
lL(76)
≤ 1
1− e−c e
−cL
∞∑
l=0
e−c(m˜
l−1) ≤Ke−cL,(77)
where the constant K <∞ only depends on c and on m˜. Taking L large
enough thus yields the result. The same argument holds in the strongest-
first case. 
Now using Proposition 6.7, the proof of Theorem 6.5 becomes straight-
forward:
Proof of Theorem 6.5. Let n be fixed and choose 0< δ <mF (τ)−1.
First consider the event
Ωε,δ,L=
{
Wn+l+1
Wn+l
>mF (τ)− δ for all l≥ 0, and Wn ≥ L
}
⊂Ω,(78)
for any L> 0. Proposition 6.7 means that P[Ωε,δ,L]≥ (1−ε)P[Wn ≥ L] when-
ever L ≥ Lε,δ. On Ωε,δ,L, it is clear that Wn+l →∞ a.s. as l →∞, and
Lemma 6.2 then implies that Wn+l+1/Wn+l→mF (τ) a.s. as l→∞. Hence,
there exists a sufficiently large Kε,δ ≥ 0 such that
P
[
Ωε,δ,L ∩
{
sup
l≥Kε,δ
∣∣∣∣Wn+l+1Wn+l −mF (τ)
∣∣∣∣< δ}]≥ (1− ε)P[Ωε,δ,L].(79)
Choose such a Kε,δ. Then, since, for any fixed k, Lemma 6.2 gives Nk(Dk(j),
Rk(j))/j→mF (τ) a.s. as j→∞, we deduce that, for some sufficiently large
L′ε,δ > 0,
P
[
sup
0≤l<Kε,δ
∣∣∣∣Wn+l+1Wn+l −mF (τ)
∣∣∣∣< δ∣∣∣Wn+l ≥L′ε,δ, for all 0≤ l <Kε,δ]
(80)
≥ 1− ε.
Now note that, whenever L≥ L′ε,δ, we have on Ωε,δ,L the inequality Wn+l ≥
L′ε,δ for all 0≤ l <Kε,δ, so that equation (80) yields, for any L≥L′ε,δ,
P
[
Ωε,δ,L ∩
{
sup
0≤l<Kε,δ
∣∣∣∣Wn+l+1Wn+l −mF (τ)
∣∣∣∣< δ}]
(81)
≥ (1− ε)P[Ωε,δ,L].
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We can thus conclude, for L′′ε,δ = max(Lε,δ,L
′
ε,δ), using, for instance, the
Bonferroni inequality,
P
[
sup
l≥0
∣∣∣∣Wn+l+1Wn+l −mF (τ)
∣∣∣∣< δ, and Wn ≥ L′′ε,δ]
(82)
≥ (2(1− ε)− 1)P[Ωε,δ,L′′
ε,δ
]
≥ (1− 2ε)(1− ε)P[Wn ≥L′′ε,δ].(83)
Replacing ε by ε/3 yields the result. The same argument holds in the
strongest-first case. 
We can now turn to the proof of Theorem 4.13.
For that purpose, we first prove the following result, which is interesting
in itself:
Proposition 6.8. Let (Γn)n be any RDBP. Assume that m(1−F (θ))>
1. Then, for any ε, δ > 0, there exists some sufficiently large Lε,δ > 0 such
that, for all n≥ 0,
P
[⋂
l≥0
{
Γn+l+1
Γn+l
≥ Sn+l+1
Sn+l
− δ
}∣∣∣Γn = Sn ≥Lε,δ]≥ 1− ε.
Proof. Choose m˜=m(1−F (θ))− δ/2 and take δ small enough so that
m˜ > 1. Then we can write the following inequalities, similarly as in the proof
of Proposition 6.7:
P
[
Γn+l+1
Γn+l
> m˜, ∀l≥ 0
∣∣∣Γn ≥L](84)
= 1−
∞∑
l=0
P[Γn+j+1 > m˜Γn+j
(85)
for all 0≤ j < l, and Γn+l+1 ≤ m˜Γn+l|Γn ≥ L]
≥ 1−
∞∑
l=0
P[Γn+l+1 ≤ m˜Γn+l|Γn+l ≥ m˜lL](86)
≥ 1−
∞∑
l=0
∞∑
j=m˜lL
P[Γn+l+1 ≤ m˜Γn+l|Γn+l = j].(87)
Now note that, given Γn+l = Sn+l = j, we have
Sn+l+1 =Mn+l(Dn+l(j),Rn+l(j))≤QΓn+l(Dn+l(j),Rn+l(j))≤ Γn+l+1.
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Using this and the Chernov-type estimates given in Lemma 6.6, we see that
for any ε > 0, we can find a sufficiently large Lε,δ > 0 such that
P
[
Γn+l+1
Γn+l
> m˜, ∀l≥ 0
∣∣∣Γn ≥Lε,δ]
(88)
≥ 1−
∞∑
l=0
∞∑
j=m˜lL
P[Sn+l+1 ≤ m˜Sn+l|Sn+l = j]
≥ 1−C
∞∑
l=0
∞∑
j=m˜lLε,δ
e−cj ≥ 1− ε,(89)
where we argued in the second inequality exactly as in the proof of Propo-
sition 6.7. Putting this together with Theorem 6.5 yields the result. 
We can now immediately deduce Theorem 4.13:
Proof of Theorem 4.13. On the one hand, ifm(1−F (θ))> 1, Propo-
sition 6.8 yields
lim
L→∞
P
[
lim
n→∞
Γn(L)≥ lim
n→∞
Sn(L)
]
= 1.(90)
On the other hand, if m(1−F (θ))< 1, then we have proven that Sn(L)→ 0
almost surely for any L> 0 [see Theorem 4.7(a)(i)], and thus equation (90)
holds trivially. Finally, using Proposition 4.3 for the upper bound for (Γn)n
yields, as desired,
lim
L→∞
P
[
lim
n→∞
Sn(L)≤ lim
n→∞
Γn(L)≤ lim
n→∞
Wn(L)
]
= 1.(91)
It remains to prove that qW = 1⇒ qΓ = 1⇒ qS = 1. The first implication
simply follows from Proposition 4.3. Now, assuming qΓ = 1, we easily deduce,
using the regularity assumption (iii) of Section 2.7, that, for any L, we have
Γn(L)→ 0 a.s., as n→∞. Hence, equation (91) gives P[limnSn(L) = 0]→ 1,
as L→∞. It follows then that qS = 1, as we can show by contradiction, using
again the regularity assumption (iii). 
6.8. Extinction criterion for the s.f.-society (second part). In this sec-
tion, we finish the proof of Theorem 4.7, using the results of previous sec-
tion (in particular, Theorem 6.5). Therefore, we will need the boundedness
assumption for all the random variables Dkn, X
k
n and R
k
n [see regularity as-
sumption (v) of Section 2.7], while only the boundedness of the Xkn ’s was
needed for the first part of the proof in Section 6.4.
Proof of Theorem 4.7. The first part of Theorem 4.7(a) has already
been proven in Section 6.4.
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Now look at the second part, assuming r ≤ mµ and m(1 − F (θ)) > 1.
Then, Theorem 6.5 (or Proposition 6.7) gives, for any ε > 0 and for δ > 0
with m(1−F (θ))> 1 + δ,
1− qS ≥ P
[⋂
l≥0
{
Sn+l+1
Sn+l
>m(1− F (θ))− δ
}]
≥ (1− ε)P[Sn ≥ Lε,δ],(92)
so that, using the regularity assumption (iii) of Section 2.7, we can deduce
qS < 1.
Finally, equation (10) of Theorem 4.7 is another direct consequence of
Theorem 6.5 (or again Proposition 6.7). 
6.8.1. Alternative criterion for the s.f.-society. For human societies
(which constitute here the main focus interest) the condition that all random
variables are bounded can be well defended. Viewing applications of our re-
sults for populations other than human populations, it may be desirable to
do without the boundedness assumption. Recall that we needed this assump-
tion only in the proof that the s.f.-process may survive if m(1− F (θ))> 1.
Assume r ≤mµ and α :=m(1−F (θ))> 1. Recall also that the condition of
bounded claims must be maintained for the extinction criterion for the s.f.-
process. For the other variables we have, however, an alternative condition:
Lemma 6.9. Suppose that the sequence (M(D(t),R(t))t is stochastically
increasing in t for all t sufficiently large. Further, let θ be as defined in (9).
Then
m(1−F (θ))> 1 =⇒ qS < 1.
Proof. If M(D(t),R(t))t is stochastically increasing in t for all t suffi-
ciently large, then there exists an integer t0, say, such that for all v ≥ 0 and
for all t≥ t0,
P[M(D(t),R(t))≥ v]≤ P[M(D(t+1),R(t+1))≥ v].
Hence, for t1, t, t2 ∈N with t0 ≤ t1 ≤ t≤ t2, we deduce, for all v ≥ 0,
max
t∈[t1,t2]
P[M(D(t),R(t))≥ v] = P[M(D(t2),R(t2))≥ v].
The proof of Theorem 4.4(a)(ii) for the w.f.-process can now be adapted
immediately to the s.f.-process by replacing mF (τ) by m(1−F (θ)). Indeed,
for j sufficiently large the maximum probability is always on the right border
of the corresponding interval and thus under control. Inequality (40) now
remains true for the s.f.-process as well, and the rest of the proof can be
rewritten accordingly. 
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Remark 6.10. We do not know whether (M(D(t),R(t)))t is stochasti-
cally increasing for sufficiently large t for all choices of distributions of Dkn
and Rkn with finite second moments. A beginning argument is as follows.
First note that D(t) and R(t) are stochastically increasing in t and that, as
we also know,
M(D(t),R(t))
t
→m(1− F (θ)) =: α a.s. as t→∞,(93)
and the convergence of the expectations E[M(D(t),R(t))]/t thus holds as
well. Thus we can find ε > 0 with α− ε > 1, such that E[M(D(t),R(t))] is
increasing for all t≥ t0(ε). This implies that, for all t≥ t0(ε),
E[M(D(t),R(t))] =
∞∑
v=0
P[M(D(t),R(t))≥ v](94)
≤
∞∑
v=0
P[M(D(t+1),R(t+ 1))≥ v]
(95)
= E[M(D(t+1),R(t+ 1))].
It would be natural to believe that this inequality holds not only for the
sums, but also for the corresponding terms of the sums, from some t onward,
which would mean that M is stochastically increasing.
Note thatM does actually not need to be strictly stochastically increasing
for the proof of Lemma 6.9 to hold: some rapidly decreasing error (in v and
t) can indeed be admitted. More precisely, it suffices to show that there is
some big t0 such that, for all t≥ t0 and for all s,
P[M(D(t),R(t))≥ s]≤ P[M(D(t+1),R(t+1))≥ s] +C(t, s),(96)
where the corrections C must be not too big, in the sense that
∑
j C(α
j−1
ε s,
αjεs)<∞, where we choose αε = α− ε > 1, for some ε > 0 small enough.
However, even such a weakened form seems hard to prove, and we let this
problem as an open question.
7. Significance of the results. The fact that the survival criteria for both
extreme societies can be given explicitly makes the Envelopment theorem
significant. We first note that these theorems give extinction/survival criteria
in terms of the parameters m (mean offspring number), r (mean resource
creation) and the distribution function of resource claims F (from which we
also know the mean resource claim µ). Interestingly, in each case the solution
of a last relevant parameter (τ and θ, resp.) is obtained by solving a simple
integral equation involving the Lorenz curve known from Economics. Thus
the critical boundaries are explicit.
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Now recall the “safe-haven” property. We have seen that if the survival
probability of the w.f.-society is strictly positive, then, however small it may
be when starting with few individuals, it converges quickly to 1 with in-
creasing size. We conclude that, provided qW < 1, any society has always
the option of a very probable survival by letting converge their rules, if nec-
essary, toward the rules of the w.f.-society. If qW = 1, however, then, with
a fixed offspring probability law (pk)k, society must draw the consequences,
because, viewing the chance of survival, there is no alternative. The individ-
uals live beyond their means and must be instructed by the society to either
become more modest in average claims of resources or else to increase the
average reproduction of resources.
No other society in this model does as much for ensuring survival as the
w.f.-society. The price to pay under the same fixed distribution is the most
modest standard of living of individuals in this society.
The s.f.-society constitutes the other extreme. Under the given assump-
tions this society does the most for the standard of living of the few. However,
it jeopardizes the prospects of survival more than any other society.
Both extreme societies form an envelope for any society in the sense that,
in the long run, no society can exceed these bounds. We may call it a quasi-
envelope because the w.f.-society leads to a definite uniform upper bound
process whereas the s.f.-society leads, strictly speaking, only to a very prob-
able lower bound process. However, we know from the conditional envelop-
ment theorem that in the long run there cannot exist a strictly better lower
bound process, so that it is not a misnomer to speak of an envelope rather
than of a quasi-envelope.
7.1. Tractability of the model. Clearly, RDBPs are still relatively simple
models compared with what we expect we would need to model societies
in a most realistic way. However, there are strong reasons why they should
earn our attention.
First, of course, it is not realistic to look for a perfect model, and, keep-
ing this in mind, RDBPs seem to be a good approach because they give
considerable room for modeling aspects.
Second, RDBPs yield, as we have seen, not only the envelopment theo-
rem for societies but also explicit survival criteria in form of quantifiable
critical relationships between society forms. This fact should not be taken
for granted. As we have seen in the general definition of RDBPs, realistic
society forms will typically impose complicated structures. Almost all inter-
esting forms are too complicated to be tackled by generating functions or
martingale arguments, the most powerful tools in branching process theory.
Third, RDBPs are remarkably robust. The main results flowing from them
hold in more general settings. So, in particular, consider the assumption
that reproduction within a RDBP is asexual. It is interesting to know what
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happens if we replace this assumption by the natural assumption that re-
production depends on two sexes [see Daley, Hull and Taylor (1986); see
also Molina (2010) for a review of known results in this domain].
The answer is in fact in favor of RDBPs. Since survival is only possible if
the RDBP can grow without limits, the asexual reproduction mean m can
here be substituted by the so-called limiting average reproduction mean. The
average reproduction mean for a total of k “mating units” m(k) is defined
in equation (1) of Bruss (1984). In the notation of the present paper, it
translates into
m(k) =
1
k
E[D˜n(Γ˜n)|Γ˜n = k],(97)
where, unlike (Γn)n, the modified (Γ˜n)n counts now the number of “mating
units” (and not individuals) present in generation n, and D˜n(Γ˜n) denotes
the number of mating units generated by these for the next generation. If
ℓ := limk→∞m(k) exists (which is the case for the majority of natural mating
functions), then the specific form of the mating function becomes irrelevant
for extinction criteria as soon as the population size has become sufficiently
large. Hence the generalization to sexual reproduction may affect the initial
chances of reaching larger numbers of individuals within a RDBP but does
not affect the main results.
Similarly, a little reflection shows that passing from discrete time genera-
tions to more realistic “moving” generations makes it technically harder to
define the precise meaning of the strings of resource claims. However, un-
der some reasonable conditions, there are ways around the formal problems
via discretization, and moving generations do not impair the essence of the
found critical relationships between the society form, the parameters m˜, r,
µ and the function F .
8. Conclusions. Returning to the RDBPs we have defined, we shall com-
ment for the remainder of this paper on real-world conclusions by confining
our interest to the important ones.
On the one hand, we have some intuition that all societies we may think
of should have, for fixed probability laws of natality, of resource production,
and of resource consumption, somewhere their limits. On the other hand,
as we have seen, this intuition is partially wrong and requires a thorough
revision. Rigorous arguments then helped to overcome the new difficulties.
These arguments lead to more subtle conclusions. The more remarkable is,
in our opinion, that, after refinement, a major part of the original intuition
is now proven true.
It is tempting to apply these results by looking at society forms that we
see around us, or at those that mankind has tried in the past. Much insight
may be gained from learning why certain society forms have failed, and why
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others seem to do, or to have done, relatively well. It would be nice to see
that scientists who have access to data or estimates needed for the analysis
presented here will find such questions a real challenge.
In the following, we shortly discuss the main features of a few selected
societies, and how they can be seen as RDBPs.
8.1. A brief comparison of major society forms.
8.1.1. Mercantilism. Mercantilism was the dominant policy for western
societies for most of the 16th century up to the end of the 18th century,
and in some countries even to the beginning of the 19th century. There are
several forms of mercantilism, but with respect to RDBPs, there is a common
denominator to all different forms of mercantilism, that is, as we shall argue,
a state-controlled “head-and-tail policy” of distributing resources.
The philosophy of mercantilism is that the wealth of a nation, compared
with the wealth of other nations, is a zero-sum game. This implies that
leaders concentrate their interest on the competition between different states
for a common fixed wealth of the world. At the same time, the idea behind
was also that a rich country can afford a strong army to defend wealth.
Strict mercantilists, exemplified by Colbert in France, concluded that all
what counts is getting the wealth into the own country by exports and
keeping production costs of goods as low as possible. A positive balance of
trades was the main concern; imports were highly taxed.
In the interpretation of RDBPs, the members of the government or king-
dom as well as rich merchants are typically those with the larger claims.
They form the “head,” but they are relatively small in number. The “tail”
consists of the claims of those individuals in the population who have to
produce (farmers, workers, etc.). In agreement with the philosophy of mer-
cantilism, money which was spent was seen as lost. Hence production costs
were kept as low as possible. The right of emigration was denied in some
countries during certain periods, and in such cases unsatisfied claims must
be interpreted as removal by death in RDBPs. The tail is made of the modest
claims, but now to be satisfied from a reduced resource space.
In words of RDBPs mercantilism may be seen as a hybrid society, one part
living under a s.f.-policy the other part (the last majority of people) under
an enforced w.f.-policy. It can be modeled as the “sum” of two RDBPs, by
assuming (e.g.) that a certain percentage p of the common resource space is
reserved for the rich and 1− p for the poor.
8.1.2. Enlightened mercantilism. As we understand today, mercantilism
suffered from a lack of experience, or, as critics would say, a lack of under-
standing. The rules of import and export were very strict, and the idea that
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free trade creates value and that wealth is by far not a zero-sum game had
to await the arrival of great economists.
Although economists like Dudley North, John Locke and Adam Smith in
particular, undermined much of mercantilism, and saw themselves as anti-
mercantilists, one may call them today enlightened mercantilists. The new
ideas of the great value of free trade and of a motivated work force seemed
almost revolutionary, and it is true that they brought a great change and
opened the way to more recent economic societies. However, at the begin-
ning, a part of the philosophy of mercantilism was still in force. So, for
instance, the priority of inexpensive production before fair compensation
for work was still rather present, and not all defendants of the new ideas
accepted already the conclusion that the wealth of nations is no zero-sum
game.
The graph of claims in a society under enlightened mercantilism, modeled
by an RDBP, would therefore still resemble that of mercantilism, and we
would suggest a similar approach to model it as a hybrid w.f.-society and
s.f.-society. There are two clear differences: first, nations became richer once
the barriers to free trade imposed by the classical mercantilism were relaxed.
Hence, the available resource space s should be seen as getting significantly
larger. Second, the barrier between small claims and large claims became
much more fluent because the poor ones could escape more easily the society
into which they were born.
8.1.3. Modern western societies. As much as we might see large differ-
ences between western nations and their society forms, we are reminded
that everything is just relative. Seen as RDBPs with their graph of resource
claims, these societies are not really that different. On the one hand many
have quite an important common denominator, namely a rather solid social
security system. On the other hand, they typically display society forms
which leave quite some room for individual freedom and performance. They
are ranging from (controlled) free societies up to a laissez-faire societies.
The first feature (social security systems) implies that the smallest claims
are, compared with the larger ones, much bigger than in mercantilist soci-
eties, and the second one that the larger claims go in all of them through
a wide range. It is this mixture of a laissez-faire society behavior as well as
w.f.-features and s.f.-features, which would make it hard to model western
societies by RDBPs in such a way that finer differences between modern
western societies show up clearly.
8.1.4. Capitalism. Concerning capitalism, RDBPs can tell much more.
As indicated before, the s.f.-society shares features of an extreme form of
capitalism, and it is easy to understand why. The larger claims stem from
the class of people who have the power to defend them within society and
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are thus strongly correlated with financial power. The graph of claims would
look similar to the one for the s.f.-society.
In one point, things are of course different. It suffices to ask who would
effectively still create the resources which are made available by manual
work. Even in extreme forms of capitalism, there must still be some space
for the lower claims. Still, the s.f.-process is probably the most convincing
RDBP-approach to modeling capitalism.
8.1.5. Communism. Correspondingly, the w.f.-society shares undeniably
features with an extreme form of communism. If means of production are
completely in the hands of the people’s society, the larger claims are no
longer backed by personal power due to individual ownership. Hence, the
smaller claims, backed by the masses, are automatically given priority.
Again, exception must be made for the top political class, but in compar-
ison to the whole population the number of individuals in this class is very
small. Hence the overall picture of the resource claim distribution over the
whole space of currently available resources would have much similarity with
the one of the w.f.-society, and the corresponding RDBP is well-understood.
8.1.6. Extreme communism versus extreme capitalism. If we accept the
comparison of the w.f.-society and the s.f.-society with extreme versions of
communism and capitalism, respectively, then these two societies, seen as
RDBPs form, as we have seen, an envelope for all society forms.
It is a strange envelope indeed: namely, its boundaries attract and re-
pulse individuals at the same time. Neither of the extreme societies can be
expected to be seen by individuals as attractive, at least not if resources are
limited. People want to get away from extreme communism by Hypothesis 2.
They would like to increase their standard of living as far as possible and
thus leave extreme communism as quickly as possible.
In the extreme form of capitalism, things are equally unstable. Neglect-
ing the case of arbitrarily many resources for everybody, the greed of the
strongest ones kills the population from above because, typically, a large
proportion of the people will leave. This society will soon have to revise
thoroughly its philosophy. One reason is, as shown in this article, the neces-
sity to have more people to increase the survival probability. Another reason
is that there must be enough people to make the present resources available.
It is difficult to imagine that extreme capitalism could survive in reality.
In our RDBP model, it is possible under the condition m(1 − F (θ)) > 1.
This imposes not only a high productivity, but also that individual resource
creations stay i.i.d. random variables. However, work forces from different
society classes are in reality not easily exchangeable.
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8.1.7. Marxism. Returning to Hypothesis 2 and our conclusion that ex-
treme communism will never last long, RDBPs give, in a certain way, reason
to Marx for the facts, although not for the conclusion. Marx saw that it may
be hard to convince people of the advantages of his new ideology. He believed
that the “Mehrwert” (added value) of labor would then mainly benefit the
working class who creates value, and that, as a result, income of the low-
est class would go up. In RDBPs, this does not happen unless the mean
production per individual would go up.
One has to give to Marx that he was hoping that this would be the case,
that is, that not only the income of the lower class but also the overall
productivity would go up. Many opponents of communism are convinced of
the very contrary, namely that the loss of personal advantages in the ideal
communistic society will bring productivity down.
We have to stay neutral on the latter discussion because our analysis
touches only the critical relationship between demand and productivity, and
not what is behind. What RDBPs show [compare with example (i) in Sec-
tion 5] is that the added value would have to be considerable to convince
people that their search for a higher standard of living would be of little
importance.
When Marx formulated his famous promise “From each according to his
ability, to each according to his needs,” then there is nothing remarkable
about this in a RDBP. If a low productivity of an individual comes together
with a large claim, then it must be expected to happen in a model with i.i.d.
random variables. Any society can propose to serve claims independently of
their size, provided that the resource space allows for it. But this is the point.
To know whether the resource space will allow for the advertised generosity,
Marx would face the crucial question of productivity.
8.1.8. Leninism. Coming back to the question of added value, Lenin was,
compared to Marx, much more radical in his views. He went so far as advo-
cating the new ideas to be imposed by a vanguard party approach, that is,
a revolution. And this is what he got. One serious question should be asked
here. Why did Lenin push toward a revolution before knowing more about
the alleged added value by moving production tools in the hands and prop-
erty of the working class? This was completely new territory; there was no
prior experience, there were no data. What does not work in theory cannot
work in practice. For RDBPs at least it cannot work in theory if there is no
added value in creating resources. And it is difficult to imagine that Lenin
could possibly have known more about the added value in Marx’s “model”
than Marx knew himself.
8.2. Comparing ideologies. As we have seen, when maintaining the mean
resource creation constant, extreme communism cannot be a stable society.
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Nevertheless, it has one undeniable and distinguished advantage worth re-
peating: with fixed resource creation (productivity), it is superior to any
other society with respect to survival probability. The price to pay is a low
average standard of living. Extreme capitalism leads to the highest possible
average standard of living. However this does not mean much in a society
where so many of the next generation may have to emigrate. Note that in our
RDBP-model this fate may hit equally likely the own descendants so that
the conclusions may pass the test of “political correctness” so frequently
evoked today.
Individuals typically wish to increase their standard of living and Hypoth-
esis 2 will push extreme communism more and more into consumption, that
is, into a “stronger” first society of some kind. If this move stays without
control, then it will approach capitalism, the declared enemy of communism.
No wonder capitalism and communism are declared enemies. There is
more to it than politics, more than just a great difference of ideology. Seen
as RDBPs, the difference between them is fundamental because they are
as opposed to each other with respect to the natural Hypotheses 1 and 2
as they possibly can be. The extreme communism is doing everything for
Hypothesis 1 and nothing for Hypothesis 2, and the extreme capitalism
does exactly the opposite. In the setting of RDBPs, both opponents are
born losers, as we have seen, and there is little reason for born losers to be
declared enemies. Societies may test these limits, as they have done, but
any attractive society is bound to be somewhere else within the envelope of
societies.
8.3. A modest outlook. If mankind has seen several other variations of
societies which seem more attractive than the extreme societies we had to
discuss before because they stood out, then this is due to an increase of
understanding. Understanding the mechanisms and the impact of financial
instruments of a national economy, including all the instruments of monetary
policy and labor policy, these are essential factors as we believe today, and
there is little reason to doubt this. However, there is also little reason to
ignore the message of RDBPs. If the model is accepted, then the interesting
move of any society will always be toward something lying between the w.f.-
society and the s.f.-society. Not accepting this conclusion means not agreeing
with Hypotheses 1 and 2. As far as we are aware, nothing definite as this
has ever been stated and proven before.
Could data help mankind converge in its search for an optimal policy
toward an “optimum?” Hopefully yes, at least toward something like an
optimum region. Nevertheless, Hypotheses 1 and 2 will always be in force,
and hence fluctuations of policies, even around an alleged optimum must be
expected to be part of the game.
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To know to what extent, this is much harder. As we understand, dynamical
policies should now be defined and studied, whereas this paper studies the
development of a society by control decisions based on static RDBPs. The
crucial question is then how to model dynamical policies in such a way
that the tractability of the global model (already an important issue in the
present paper) can be maintained. We hope that this article may help to
pave the way for further research.
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